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TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES ON THE
BRINK: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO AND THE
US-TURKISH STRATEGIC AND MILITARY
PARTNERSHIP
INTRODUCTION
If we lose our identity, character and individuality, we
will get lost among the masses. That’s why we say, ‘One
nation, one flag, one country, one state.’ These principles
are the safety locks of our independence and future.
—Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President of Turkey, excerpt
from speech delivered on March 3, 2017.
You never really understand a person until you consider
things from his point of view . . . until you climb into his
skin and walk around in it.
—Excerpt from To Kill a Mocking Bird by Harper Lee.

The US-Turkish strategic partnership established
at the end of World War II reached its climax in the
late eighties, and is at a dangerous crossroad. Such
an outcome has had a devastating effect on Turkey’s
relationship with other Western partners, especially
NATO, which has been the backbone of America’s
defense alliance since the start of the Cold War. This
situation, if it continues, is likely to force the unraveling of NATO as a cohesive organization at a time
when it is facing a myriad of collective global security
challenges, particularly in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan—far beyond its traditional defensive posture on
the European continent. All is not lost, however, and
with more diligent diplomatic and military-to-military
dialogue and compromises, US-Turkish relations can
be salvaged.
1

States with long and deep commitments to one
another seldom experience the kind of political and
military distrust and uncertainties characterizing the
current state of affairs between Turkey and its traditional Western allies, including the United States.
Much of the ongoing tensions can be traced to the
American-led interventions in Iraq and Syria, as well
as to other fundamental strategic disagreements over
how best to shape the future of the Greater Middle
East and North Africa. Although some agencies within
the US government have had differences with Turkey
over the latter’s increasingly authoritarian bent, not all
elements within the US government are in agreement
with the reasons or path forward. No one factor can
be attributed to the new authoritarian trend in Turkey.
After all, the majority of the Turkish public, through
elections and referendums, has given President Tayyip
Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP)
the mandate they need to rule and change the political rules of the game in Turkey. Moreover, Turkey’s
deeply fragmented political system and its weak political parties have played a role in the changes in the
nature and the character of Turkey’s political system
from a military authoritarian one to a civilian authoritarian one.
From Turkey’s perspective, the United States and
NATO have turned upside down the game plans of
others in the region, chief among them Turkey’s ruling
AKP and its leader, President Erdogan. Using some
imagination, one can foresee the adverse impacts
American operational and tactical moves have had on
Turkey since the invasion of Iraq in 2003; and more
recently, since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War
in 2011. America’s sponsorship, training, and military support of the Kurd-dominated Arab democratic
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force in Syria—a compilation of predominantly Kurdish fighters and supporters affiliated with the Syrian
Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD); its military
wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG); and the
Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), fighters which Turkey
considers its most dangerous political and military
nemeses—have strained US-Turkish relations and
impacted Turkish public opinion of the United States
in a negative way. Turkey views Western military
and logistical support for Kurds in Syria and Iraq as
inimical to its broader regional interest of containing
Kurdish nationalism in Turkey and beyond and preventing the emergence of Syrian Kurdish enclaves
close to its southeast borders, where the bulk of Turkish Kurds reside. Turkey’s long-term position on any
autonomous or federated Kurdish enclaves in surrounding regional states could invite calls by Turkish
Kurds for similar calls and encourage the PKK—a USdesignated terror organization—to continue carrying
out cross-border attacks on Turkish institutions and
territory.
Although there has been no indication so far that
rules of engagement involving US military trainees
and special forces units have changed as far as Turkey’s security along its southeastern frontier is concerned, the potential for serious clashes between the
Turkish military and the Syrian Kurds has been growing following the fall of Raqqa, the seat of the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS’s) caliphate in Syria and
Iraq. Since the summer of 2012, the Turkish media
has frequently reported incidents of Turkish fighter
jets and ground forces taking off from their bases to
chase off Syrian Kurdish units operating too close
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to Turkey’s border.1 Ankara-backed Syrian groups
fighting Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime
have emerged as the main beneficiary of these rules
of engagement, which have effectively served as a
Turkish cover for the country’s military and logistical
operations in border regions, especially since the fall
of the Syrian town of Afrin and the expulsion of Kurdish fighters from there by Turkish troops and their
Muslim Syrian Sunni fighter allies, including the Free
Syrian Army, on March 18, 2018.
Anti-Americanism in Turkey appears to be increasing as the war in Syria continues unabated. These attitudes, if they persist, are likely to adversely affect the
resiliency of the traditional partnership among the
United States, Turkey, and NATO—especially the
military-to-military relationship—including basing
rights and other defense commitments enshrined in
NATO’s declaration of principles. Turkey is already
moving toward an uneasy strategic alliance with
Russia and Iran to address the future of Syria and
to diversify its logistical and military weapon purchases and ultimate dependency beyond NATO. The
proposed Turkish purchase of the S-400 air defense
system from Russia to compensate for Turkey’s gap
in air defense capability and the consummation of a
long-standing nuclear power deal following years of
delicate negotiations between Russia and Turkey will
most certainly have profound security implications for
the United States, NATO, and the Middle Eastern and
North African states. The S-400 acquisition by Turkey
poses two problems for NATO: (1) a lack of interoperability with existing NATO platforms and (2) fear
1. Gunay Yildiz, “Turkey’s War with PKK Reaches New
Peak,” BBC News, September 21, 2012, https://www.bbc.com/news
/world-europe-19650034.
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that increased military cooperation between Russia
and Turkey could expose NATO platforms to Russian
espionage activities, ultimately undermine Turkey’s
resolve and commitment to NATO, and weaken the
organization. Russian President Vladimir Putin has
long sought to weaken NATO, which he considers an
existential threat to his state.
FROM PARTNERS TO UNSETTLED RELATIONS
US-Turkey strategic relations are complicated
because of differing cultural and political values and
competing priorities, but they were not always as
problematic as they are today. With the end of the
Second World War, Turkey shifted away from its interwar-period stance of neutrality toward a more robust
alliance with NATO and the United States. Though
Turkey received many benefits when it entered into
the Western orbit, the country also acquired structural problems that persist to this day. At the international level, Turkey benefited from the Marshall Plan
by bursting out from its self-imposed isolation of the
interwar period into the global arena. Turkish reconstruction workers were admitted liberally to Germany
and other Western European countries without visa
restrictions as guest workers, and the new international trade and monetary system created at Bretton
Woods helped Turkey’s sluggish economy get a jumpstart as the country moved from a one-party to a multiparty political system in the 1950s. The United States
also established close bilateral relations with Turkey,
supporting its military and security services—a trademark of the new Turkish republic under its founder,
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk—while urging Western-style
democratization and protection of human and civil
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rights. For the next 50 years, Turkish-US relations
were based on this military-to-military foundation as
a result of the Cold War and fear of the communist
domino effect in the Greater Middle East, including
Iran, Greece, and Turkey. As a result, Turkey joined
NATO, sent troops to augment the UN-led forces
on the Korean Peninsula during the Korean War,
and integrated its weapon- and intelligencegathering platforms with those of NATO and the
United States. Turkey was the first state in the Muslimmajority Middle East to recognize the state of Israel
in 1949. Despite Turkish public opposition, the move
was supported by the pro-Western Turkish General
Staff. Turkey, along with Israel, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi
Arabia, would become the first line of defense against
communist penetration in the region.2
There were, however, differences between the
United States and Turkey over the status of Cypriot
Turkish minorities in the 1960s and 1970s. The Johnson administration warned Turkey’s military-led government against sending troops to Cyprus in support
of the newly established Turkish enclaves in the 1960s,
which Turkey accepted reluctantly. But no sooner than
the Vietnam War was winding down, Turkey once
again raised the specter of protecting Turkish Muslim
Cypriot minorities following the takeover of the entire
island by a military junta closely aligned with its counterpart in Athens in 1974.3 Turkey invaded Cyprus on
2. George Lenczwoski, “Doctrinal Foundations,” in Soviet
Advances in the Middle East (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1972), 5–22; and George Lenczowski, The Middle
East in World Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971),
57–165.
3. Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since
the Cold War (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2003),
117–124; Michael A. Reynolds, Echoes of Empire: Turkey’s Crisis of
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July 20, 1974, and immediately occupied one-third of
the island. To this day, Turkey still maintains over
45,000 troops there, complicating its relationship with
Greece—a fellow NATO member—and contributing
to occasional political tensions as a result of historical animosities and border disputes along Turkey’s
Aegean coast. More recently, Turkey and Greece have
been locked into a new dispute over the defection
of Turkish officers to Greece following the July 2016
failed coup in Turkey. Turkey has accused the officers
of complicity in the coup, but Greece refuses to extradite them back to Turkey, citing EU human- and
civil-rights protocols and the rule of law against potential Turkish mistreatment and torture and its unfair
trial system.4
Kemalism and the Search for an Alternative Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2012), iii–33; and Nicole and
Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey (New
York, NY: Overlook Press, 2004), 109–125. A comprehensive
approach on the Cyprus problem can be found in Ahmet Sozen,
Reflections on the Cyprus Problem: A Compilation of Recent Academic
Contributions (Northern Cyprus: Eastern Mediterranean University Press, 2007). Also see Joseph S. Joseph, “Cyprus: Domestic
Ethnopolitical Conflict and International Relations,” in Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 15, no. 1 (December 2009): 376–397.
4. Michele Kambas, “Greece on Turkey Asylum Row: Democracies Cannot Threaten or Be Threatened,” Reuters, December 31,
2017; “Turkey, Greece Trade Barbs Over Arrestees,” Hurriyet Daily
News, April 3, 2018; and “Turkey Arrests 2 Greek Soldiers Who
Strayed into Country,” Associated Press, March 2, 2018. Turkey
wants to exchange the two with the Turkish military defectors
and asylum seekers in Greece. Earlier, President Erdogan had
suggested changes to the Lausanne Treaty that ended Turkey’s
War of Liberation against Greece after the Great War. Greece has
refused to concede on all of these issues, including the Lausanne
Treaty that settled the border issue between Turkey and Greece,
except for a few Aegean islands still in dispute today; “Lausanne
Treaty Needs to Be Revised for Turks in Greece, Erdogan Says
on Athens Visit,” Daily Sabah, December 7, 2017. Turkish press
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Despite these bumps in the road, Turkey’s military
and security cooperation with its US and NATO partners and with Israel remained strong throughout the
Cold War because of the Soviet threat. Turkey continued to benefit from these associations as it continued
to strengthen its formidable military institution, long
considered by the general Turkish public as highly
professional and uncorrupted by the political bickering that had plagued Turkish political parties since the
early 1950s. The military was seen as bringing stability and security to the state through accepted coups
as corrective measures, as long as the military eventually relinquished power to civilian control. Usually,
such coups followed periods of lawlessness, leading
to party-inspired, if not party-directed, violence; political and economic stagnation; and domestic, political
instability. Whereas the United States supported these
corrective measures by the Turkish military for the
sake of safeguarding Turkey’s domestic tranquility
and commitments to NATO and US strategic interests,
the United States, along with its Western European
partners, continued to press Turkey’s military toward
a more transparent political system and the protection
of human and civil rights the military had violated
repeatedly since 1960, especially following the 1980
coup.5
reports on August 14, 2018, said the two Greek soldiers had been
released and sent back to Greece in an effort by the Erdogan government to reduce tensions with Turkey’s neighbor, Greece.
5. Pope and Pope, Turkey Unveiled, 141–157. These irritants in Turkey’s relations with its Western allies, including the
United States—especially the development of nondemocratic,
military-sponsored, and unsponsored, authoritarian regimes—
continue to this day to scuttle progress toward better relations
between Turkey and its allies on many fronts. With the advent
of AKP’s power in 2002 and the rise of the current President of
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These irritants in Turkey’s relations with its Western allies, including the United States, continue to
scuttle progress toward better relations between
Turkey and its allies on many fronts. With the rise of
the AKP to power in 2002 and the rise of President
Erdogan, Turkey’s authoritarian tendencies have been
transformed from being military in nature to becoming a civilian trademark.
From 2002 to 2010, the AKP under then-Prime
Minister Erdogan achieved two major accomplishments—namely, the transformation of its military and
unprecedented economic growth.6 As a result of failed
attempts to seize power in July 2016, as it did successfully in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997, the Turkish military
today has been purged, and most of its high-ranking
officers have either retired, been imprisoned pending trials, or are serving long jail sentences. Although
Erdogan has used the attempted coup to increase his
political fortunes, there is no doubt he survived an
assassination attempt on July 15, 2016, while vacationing in Marmaris.
Erdogan is the commander-in-chief of a very different armed forces today than the one that existed
prior to 2002. He, along with his former loyalist Prime
Minister, Binali Yilderim, who is currently speaker of
the Parliament, influences military appointments and
deployment decisions, dismissing at will officers suspected of being disloyal to the AKP regime or who
have the potential to overthrow the government by
Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s authoritarian tendencies
has been transformed from being military in nature to becoming
a civilian trademark, much to the displeasure of Turkey’s allies.
6. “Turkey—Sustained and Equitable Growth for Continued Economic Success,” World Bank, April 20, 2012, https://www
.worldbank.org/en/results/2012/04/20/turkey-sustained-and
-equitable-growth-for-continued-economic-success.

9

force. As a result, Turkey’s armed forces have suffered
recently from readiness issues associated with personnel instability, logistics, and military equipment. Even
the Turkish General Staff, which used to be an independent body, has been brought under the Ministry of
Defense to better control its officer corps.7
Turkey’s relations with the Western alliance,
and especially the United States, also experienced a
downturn following the Arab popular uprisings in
2011. Unlike its NATO partners, Turkey objected to
the overthrow of Libya’s Muammar Gadhafi because
Turkish companies stood to lose lucrative construction contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars.
It only reluctantly changed its position to avoid being
left out of any pending Libyan political arrangements
following Gadhafi’s overthrow.
DISAGREEMENT OVER SYRIA
Turkey’s original approach to the Syrian uprising against President Assad differed markedly in the
beginning from that of the United States. Prior to the
Arab popular uprisings in 2011 and in Syria, in particular, Turkey sought to develop an independent
political and diplomatic strategy vis-à-vis the Syrian
regime of President Assad. This strategy was based
7. Lars Haugom, An Uncertain Future for the Turkish Armed
Forces (Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies,
September 2017). In a scathing article against President Erdogan’s
control over the Turkish military—ironically a Western democratic imperative of civilian control over the military—a noted
Turkey scholar, Steven Cook, argues that Erdogan’s recent actions
vis-à-vis his military are increasingly leading to the politicization
of the military, thus resulting in decline in general morale, preparedness, and readiness. Steven A. Cook, “General Erdogan’s
First War,” Foreign Policy, February 7, 2018, www.foreignpolicy
.com/2018/02/07/general-erdogans-first-war/.
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on Prime Minister Davutoglu’s dictum of “zero problem with neighbors” and “strategic depth”—the idea
that Turkey’s national heritage rests on deep historical and cultural ties to its past and to its regional
Muslim-state neighbors to the east. Davutoglu made
over 60 cordial visits to Damascus to woo Assad away
from his close ties to Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon
at the regional level and from Russia at the international level. In return, Turkey offered to help Syria
in its bid to recover the Golan Heights, occupied by
Israel since the Six Day War in 1967 and a key sticking point in previous negotiations between Israel
and Syria.8 Turkey attempted similar peace overtures
between Israel and the Palestinians in the occupied
West Bank, and also the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip.
Prime Minister Erdogan and his family established a
close familial relationship with Assad, and Turkish
firms flourished in the Aleppo region of Syria under
several joint-venture arrangements made between
2002 and 2011. As the situation inside Syria began to
deteriorate in 2011, Turkey advised Assad to bring
about much-needed economic and political reforms
to no avail. Assad simply refused, equating such pleas
with Turkish desires to weaken his grip on power,
which he had inherited from his father, Hafez, in June
2000 as a family-run authoritarian enterprise. By 2012,
Turkish strategy toward Syria and the Arab World
began to shift in the direction of regime change and
support for moderate Sunni Muslim uprisings against
Arab regimes, including Assad’s. Turkey felt it could

8. “Turkey’s Davutoglu Gives Arab Spring Lecture in US,”
Hurriyet Daily News, February 11, 2012, http://www.hurriyetdaily
news.com/turkeys-davutoglu-gives-arab-spring-lecture-in-us-13532.
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transform the region to serve its strategic interests and
growing influence.9
The United States welcomed the new support
from Turkey for regime change in Damascus, and the
two allies’ interests temporarily converged. As the
civil war in Syria dragged on, however, and a clear
outcome became increasingly elusive, fissures in the
Turkish-American alliance began to surface. This
development was exacerbated by the huge influx of
Syrian refugees into Turkey, estimated in late 2017 to
be about three million, which created a major humanitarian and financial burden. By 2013, Turkey started
calling for a no-fly zone inside Syria to create a secure
and militarily enforced safe haven that would hasten
the return of Syrian refugees back to their homeland.
The United States was cool to the safe-haven idea
for three reasons: (1) opposition by some policy circles within the Obama administration to the Syrian
safe-haven idea; (2) reluctance on the part of the
Obama administration to be directly involved in yet
another war following the high cost of America’s
involvement in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; and
(3) opposition by Russia—a key Syrian ally—to any
direct American military intervention to topple Assad,
much as the US and NATO had done in Libya.10
9. Graham E. Fuller, Turkey and the Arab Spring: Leadership in
the Middle East (New York: Bozorg Press, 2014), 309–11.
10. Mathew Jaffe, “Obama Advisor Explains Why Clinton’s
Syria Plan Won’t Work,” CNN, April 18, 2016, https://www.cnn
.com/2016/04/18/politics/axelrod-axe-files-ben-rhodes-syria/index.html;
Jeffrey Mankoff, “Why Moscow Fears Arab Unrest,” Current History 111, issue 74 (October 2012), 258–63; Samuel Charap, “Russia,
Syria, and the Doctrine of Intervention,” Survival 55, no. 1 (February-March 2013), 35–41; Dan Treisman, “Why Russia Supports
Syria’s Assad,” UCLA TODAY, January 14, 2014; Neil MacFarquhar, “Russia Plotting for Ukrainian Influence, Not Invasion,
Analysts Say,” New York Times, April 9, 2014, https://www.nytimes
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The United States has fewer national security interests in Syria compared to Turkey. The US strategic
objectives there included safeguarding Israel’s borders, containing Iran and its Hezbollah proxy in the
Eastern Mediterranean, and degrading and ultimately
ending ISIS and al-Qaeda terror activities in the region.
In contrast, Syria is a potentially existential threat to
Turkey because of the Kurdish factor. Like the United
States, Turkey worries about the potential escalation
and violent spillover into its territory as well as the
long-term, adverse, economic consequences of the
Syrian refugee crisis and the free movement of Turkish goods and services to surrounding Arab and other
regional markets, including Iran.
At the regional level for the United States, the
unrest in Syria touched on key issues surrounding
America’s closest allies in the Middle East, including Israel and many gulf Arab states. Israeli policymakers have been increasingly wary of the spillover
effects from the Syrian Civil War on Israel since the
beginning of the Syrian uprising in 2011 because of the
ensuing chaos and anarchy there as well as the growing power and influence of Iran and Hezbollah with
the help of Russia in both Syria and Lebanon. Some of
the Arab gulf states—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain in particular—oppose
Iran’s adventurism in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon and
worry about the increasing influence of Tehran on
the restless Shia minorities within their states and
.com/2014/04/10/world/europe/russia-plotting-for-ukrainian
-influence-not-invasion-analysts-say.html; and Anne Barnard and
Rick Gladstone, “Russia Seeks to Exert More Influence Over
Syria Conflict,” New York Times, April 4, 2012, https://www.nytimes
.com/2012/04/05/world/middleeast/russia-accuses-group-of
-undermining-peace-plan-in-syria.html.
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affiliated Shia communities in neighboring states, such
as Yemen and Kuwait.
While the United States and Turkey agreed in the
initial stages of the Syrian Civil War that President
Assad must go, neither side had figured out who
would replace him, given the fluidity and shifting
alliances among Syria’s warring factions. At one level
stands the secular Free Syrian Army, comprised of
defectors and rebels from within Syria’s armed forces.
At another level are pro-al-Qaeda Nusra Front/Jabhat
Fath al-Sham Syrian militias and ISIS fighters. At a
third level are Syrian Kurdish militias, some of whom
were aligned with Turkey’s old nemesis, the PKK,
which the United States and Turkey consider a terrorist organization. Others, such as the Syrian Kurdish
PYD militia, are tactically aligned with the PKK, but
a small minority of them are strategically sympathetic
to the Kurdistan Regional Government of Masoud
Barzani clan in northern Iraq. The PYD was given a
free hand by Assad, who allowed it to operate unchallenged as retaliation for Turkish and US support for
the Syrian political and military Sunni factions. The
PYD has been seeking autonomy in Syrian towns and
villages such as Qamishli, Kobani, and Afrin, which
formed a strategic, Kurdish, liberated belt from ISIS
and other Syrian militias beginning in October 2014—
ironically with US air support, which Turkey resented.
Although the PYD has not directly challenged the
Assad regime, the latter’s overall strategy for Syria in
the long term is to reestablish the total control over
Syrian territory it enjoyed on the eve of the start of
the civil war in 2011. Turkey sought to set up Sunni
rival areas inside Syria, especially around Aleppo,
to counter the Kurdish move because the presence
of active pro-PKK Kurdish militias so close to the
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Turkish border was unacceptable. Turkey does not
want the insurgent anti-Turkish Kurds to have a free
hand inside Syria because it fears that such a presence
could ultimately lead to more tangible demands for
cultural and ethnic rights for the Kurds inside Turkey.
The Turkish government since the time of Ataturk had
objected categorically to the emergence of a Kurdish
entity in the region, especially inside Turkey’s southeastern provinces.11
The Kurdish problem in Turkey goes to the heart
of national identity and Turkish nationalism. The
Kurds fared rather well under the Ottoman Empire by
being left alone to practice their religious and cultural
beliefs. Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, set out
in 1923 to build a new national identity based solely on
the idea of Turkishness. This concept simply replaced
the more culturally tolerant, multicultural, multiethnic, and multireligious aspects of the Ottoman Empire.
The concept rejected minority rights for Greeks, Armenians, Alawis, and Kurds by establishing one national
identity based on a state-driven secularism, unity of
purpose, modern-day Turkish patriotism, and nationalism based on ethnic and national ties to old Central
Asian tribes who invaded Asia Minor and ultimately
succeeded in establishing the Ottoman dynasty in the
fourteenth century AD.
Unlike the United States, Turkey’s primary driver
of its foreign policy toward Syria is the Kurdish problem. Turkey will not tolerate the rise of a competing
Kurdish national entity in Syria and Iraq so close to
its predominantly Kurdish southeastern provinces
11. Robert Olson, “Denied a State, Winning a Region: Comparing Kurdish Nationalism After 1918 and 2003,” in The Kurdish
Policy Imperative, ed. Robert Lowe and Gareth Stanfield (London,
UK: Chatham House, 2010), 27–50.
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for fear this might lead to calls for Kurdish autonomy
and, ultimately, secession. Turkey fears dismemberment first and foremost when it comes to Greek and
Kurdish demands for the return of lost rights and territories. This is the crux of the Armenian problem for
Turkey. Unlike successive presidential administrations in Washington, Congress has been more sympathetic toward minority rights in Turkey, including
for the Armenian, Kurdish, and Greek communities;
this has been a source of continuing tension between
the two NATO allies and continues to contribute to
the misunderstanding of each side’s intentions and
positions.
The ongoing Turkish-US-NATO tension and US
and EU support for the PYD, the YPG, and the PKK in
the quest to hold on to vast swaths of territory taken
back from ISIS in 2017 in Syria and Iraq is part of two
broader strategic trends inimical to Turkish interests.
The first is US attempts to totally defeat ISIS by using
Kurdish paramilitary units, avoiding full-scale US
military troop deployment. Such a trend provokes an
escalation of the PKK/PYD/YPG conflict with Turkish forces, aimed at getting the PYD to consolidate its
presence in these territories, especially those along the
Turkish borders west of the Euphrates River—areas
contiguous to Kurdish border towns and villages
inside Turkey. The second has to do with the mismatch between the standing US policy to focus and
advance the anti-ISIS fight and the originally floated
idea of elements within the US military advisor units
in Syria to establish a Kurd-led security stabilization
force of 30,000 fighters, thereby enabling de facto
Kurdish autonomous enclaves inside Syria in Manbij,
Kobani, and Raqqa, close to Turkey’s border areas
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with Syria.12 The scale of US support and military
presence in Syria has guaranteed the Kurdish forces’
loyalty to the United States and is raising Syrian Kurdish expectations and calls for secession from Syria.
Turkey’s strategic interests in Syria have caused
major tensions with the United States that, if not managed properly, are likely to continue and cause more
permanent fissures. At the same time, Ankara and
Washington have discussed the idea of setting up a
predominantly Arab-led stabilization force in Syria as
a hedge against any potential ISIS resurgence. Such
plans are currently on hold because of the political
tensions between the two nations.13
Turkey’s future military rules of engagement will
most certainly favor containing Kurdish forces and
associated militias, ending the de facto cover for the
Kurdish rebels by the United States and its NATO
partners. This scenario, however, could jeopardize the
long-term fight against ISIS and other terrorist groups
and could likely endanger the resilience of the current
coalition against violent extremism in Syria and Iraq,
where the United States retains a significant presence.
But it would also have an adverse effect on the inner
workings of NATO, a goal most satisfactory to America’s other adversaries, Russia and Iran. Similarly,
12. Joanne Stocker, “Coalition Retraining 15,000 Veteran
SDF Fighters to Serve as Syrian Border Force,” Defense Post, January 13, 2018, https://thedefensepost.com/2018/01/13/syria-border
-security-force-sdf-coalition/. This article also points out that the
30,000-strong force will be partly composed of veteran fighters
and operate under the leadership of the Syrian Democratic Forces,
according to the Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent
Resolve.
13. Ranking officers at the US Department of State (DoS),
interview by the author, March 14, 2018; and ranking officers at
the US Department of Defense (DoD), interview by the author,
March 23, 2018.
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Ankara’s intention to create a safe zone along the
border stretching from Jarablus to Azaz inside Syria
has become completely meaningless since the United
States began backing the Kurd-dominated Arab democratic force. Preventing Syrian Kurds from controlling
Syrian territory, which could in turn be used by more
radical Kurdish elements against Turkish border
towns and beyond, is the first priority for such a zone.
Turkey believes this requires its continuous vigilance
and the use of force against America’s Arab democratic
force allies. Thus, the Turkish deployment of interceptor fighter jets in Syria can be explained only with one
objective in mind—namely, to stop the United States
from supporting the Arab democratic force and affiliated Kurdish militias. No other explanation is realistic, given that Turkish-sponsored, anti-Assad, Sunni
militias, such as the al-Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front/
Jabhat Fath al-Sham, the Free Syrian Army, and the
Ahrar al-Sham, would not have had the wherewithal
to carry on the fight without direct Turkish military
backing. The eventual withdrawal of US military personnel from Syria, which would end direct support
for the Syrian Kurdish militias, would also reduce tensions between Turkey and its NATO allies, including
the United States. At the same time, however, Turkey
must still contend with Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah in
Syria, all of which are adamant about restoring President Assad’s full control over all Syrian territory.
Turkey may end up having to swallow a bitter pill,
but at least it would have some say about the illogic
of having a Syrian Kurdish enclave close to its border.
Turkey’s current problems with the United States
stem from different priorities, which are in turn different from those of the US-led coalition against ISIS.
Turkey may have opened its air bases to make coalition
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airstrikes on ISIS more efficient and less costly, but
this does not mean that fighting ISIS has become a
top priority for Erdogan and Turkey. Defeating ISIS is
not and has never been a priority for Erdogan or his
ruling AKP. President Erdogan, for instance, waited
until September 25, 2014, to finally brand ISIS a terrorist group. In short, Erdogan is unhappy with US
policies in Syria, which he sees as having in part led
to a clear and present security breach on his southern
border, interfered in his ability to defend his country,
and inundated Turkey with over 3.5 million refugees,
twice the number of refugees who flooded Europe in
the last three years.
Deep strategic differences exist between the United
States and Turkey over the future of the Assad regime.
Turkey sees the current fight against ISIS as secondary
to its long-term strategy of shaping the future of the
greater Middle East and North Africa. On the surface,
the end state for Turkey is a stable, secure, and friendly
Syrian neighbor, but below is a carefully orchestrated
plan to continue influencing domestic and regional
Syrian and Arab dynamics. To do this right, Turkey
will have to play a balance-of-power game based on
placating Russia and Iran while keeping the United
States at bay, as evidenced by its current involvement
in the multiple cease-fire arrangements engineered by
Russia and Iran in Astana, Kazakhstan; Sochi, Russia;
and more recently, Ankara, Turkey.
THE GULEN AFFAIR
Turkey and its Western NATO allies, including
the United States, at first touted Turkey’s miracle economic growth under the conservative Islamic AKP
regime as a model to be emulated by other Islamic
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regimes in the Middle East and North Africa. President Obama made his first trip overseas as president
when he arrived in Turkey on April 15, 2009. He gave
a major speech there praising Turkey’s moderate form
of Islam and stressed the United States was not at war
with Muslims around the world. Eventually, Erdogan’s authoritarian overreaching tendencies in the
form of continued violations of human and civil rights
and suppression of freedom of speech and press in
Turkey raised serious questions in the United States
and in Western European circles about the negative
direction of Turkish democracy.
The reaction of the AKP and its supporters to the
July 2016 coup was swift and hard. Thousands of military officers were rounded up and then either dismissed, jailed, or put on trial. Secular Kemalist civilian
government sympathizers, including liberal anti-AKP
journalists, also met the same fate. More importantly,
Erdogan accused his old partner, Fetullah Gulen—a
reclusive, progressive, Turkish Muslim philosopher
and theorist with vast followings in Turkey and
around the world, and currently in self-imposed exile
in Pennsylvania—with instigating the July 2016 coup.
The two parted ways in 2010 after years of collaborating against the Turkish military. Gulen has denied
any involvement and has surrounded himself with a
strong defense of American lawyers and lobbyists in
response. Gulen and his supporters were part of the
AKP-led economic miracle between 2002 and 2010—a
marriage of convenience in the form of the so-called
Anatolian Tigers. The Tigers established successful
business models in finance, banking, industry, agriculture, private charter schools, and universities throughout the world—especially in the United States under
the Turkish-American Federation and its successor,
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the Turkic American Alliance, including the Rumi
organization, with headquarters in Washington, DC,
and chapters throughout the United States.14
The Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and
Industrialists, the association of Turkic business and
trade professionals, is a worldwide organization with
a strong presence in Central Asia whose many members share an ethnic, religious, and cultural affinity to
Turkey. But this success story extends to other continents, including Africa, the Middle East, South America, Europe, and North America.
The federation was a Gulen-affiliated, highly successful, Anatolian Tiger, manufacturing and agricultural model of development under the AKP that in
turn fueled Turkey’s high economic rise between 2002
and 2010. Members represented a new cadre of conservative and devout Muslim businessmen and businesswomen who were closely linked to Turkey’s banking,
finance, and investment institutions worldwide—
hence, the federation’s growing prestige and influence under the AKP’s umbrella. The federation had
a US headquarters office close to the White House in
Washington and hosted some of the most prestigious
conferences, where many members of both houses of
Congress and other US government officials and associated stakeholders visited regularly. Gulen, a disciple
of an Anatolian religious scholar, believed that Islam
is compatible with and can coexist with the Western
values of modernity and progress through rationalism, science, Western-style education, and interfaith

14. The Turkic American Alliance web page lists dozens
of such active chapters and associated chapters throughout the
United States alone.
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dialogue.15 A noted Turkish scholar, Omer Taspinar,
argues Gulen and his supporters, unlike Erdogan’s
AKP, did not seek an Islamist state in Turkey; rather,
they sought to gradually transform the state in their
image as a secular but conservative interfaith dialogue
movement. He stressed that when Erdogan tried to
rein in Gulen and his movement, they resisted and
turned against him. Erdogan retaliated by closing
their schools and nationalizing their lucrative and
thriving businesses. In turn, Gulen and his followers
responded by allegedly fueling a corruption scandal
around Erdogan and his family starting in December
2013.16
The increasing clout of Gulen and his followers in
Turkey and elsewhere did not sit well with Erdogan
since the former was viewed as a power rival. It was
only a matter of time before the two would part ways,
starting in 2010, but not materializing fully until after
the attempted coup. Erdogan immediately demanded
that the United States hand Gulen over to Turkey to
stand trial for instigating and ordering the coup, a
charge which Gulen fully denies. The US Department
of Justice requested Turkey send concrete evidence of
Gulen’s involvement in the coup, but the Turkish legal
documents sent were either incomplete or inadequate
for making a decision. Turkey has also accused the
Gulen movement of being behind the assassination
in Ankara of Andrei Karlov, the Russian ambassador, and has added this complaint to its US extradition request.17 Erdogan’s government unsuccessfully
15. Omer Taspinar, “Panel Comments” (speech, The PolicyForum of the Washington Near East Institute, Washington, DC,
July 13, 2017).
16. Taspinar, “Panel Comments.”
17. “US ‘Awaiting Evidence’ From Turkey over Gulen’s
Links to Murder of Russian Envoy Karlov,” Hurriyet Daily News,
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urged both President Obama and President Trump
to circumvent the US judicial process and expedite
Gulen’s extradition. Obama and Trump both held
firmly against any deal on Gulen, citing internal judicial procedures that must first be met by Turkey.
Erdogan has reacted negatively to the United
States over the Gulen affair, arguing that the United
States is being pressured by anti-Turkish Gulen supporters in Congress and elsewhere not to give in to
Turkey’s demand by exaggerating Erdogan’s authoritarianism and his constant violation of human and
civil rights and attacks on free press and speech.18
April 3, 2018, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/us-to-consider
-extraditing-gulen-over-murder-of-russian-envoy-karlov-justice
-department-spokesperson-129689.
18. Relations between Gulen and Erdogan began to rupture
before July 2016, as outlined in the text over the growing political
influence and power of Gulen over the Turkish political, economic,
social, and security system. They actually started to unravel on
May 31, 2010, following Gulen’s lukewarm reaction to the ill-fated
attempt by a group of AKP humanitarian civilian sympathizers
to ramp through an Israeli naval blockade off the Gaza Strip in
an attempt to deliver medicine and other humanitarian supplies
to the besieged strip. Gulen’s reaction to the MV Mavi Marmara
flotilla incident was lukewarm in light of Erdogan’s strong public
condemnation of Israel for the killing of 10 Turkish citizens on the
boat (9 Israeli soldiers were injured in the confrontation, which
took place in international waters just outside the Gaza Strip
between the Turkish civilians on board and Israeli commandos
who stormed the flotilla in an attempt to prevent it from crossing
into Israeli waters). Erdogan demanded monetary compensation
for the Turkish families affected by the Israeli attack, an apology
from the Israeli government for the incident, and free movement
of goods for humanitarian purposes through Israeli land checkpoints. Israel agreed to all of these demands after many years of
secret negotiations. Joe Lauria, “Reclusive Turkish Imam Criticizes Gaza Flotilla,” Wall Street Journal, June 4, 2010, https://www
.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487040253045752847212802
74694; and Nimrod Goren, “An Unfulfilled Opportunity for
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Erdogan reacted to the American rebuff by embarking
on a series of extrajudicial actions of his own against
alleged Gulen supporters, using his state-of-emergency powers granted to him by the Turkish Parliament and the public. As a result, Erdogan and his
government set out to hunt down and arrest more
alleged coup plotters and Gulen sympathizers, including US and Western European citizens.19
Turkey arrested a Turkish foreign service national
working for the US consulate, Metin Topuz, in Istanbul in October 2017 for his alleged affiliation with
Gulen. This prompted the United States to temporarily
halt the issuance of travel visas to Turkish citizens in
retaliation, although the visa issue was later resolved
through diplomatic channels. Another Turkish citizen
working at the US consular office in Adana, Turkey,
was also imprisoned for alleged connections to Gulen.
Most notably, shortly after the attempted coup,
Turkey detained an American pastor, Andrew Brunson, who had lived in Turkey for 23 years, and accused
him of complicity with Gulen’s network to stir up
Kurdish rebellions in Turkey in a quest to destabilize
Reconciliation: Israel and Turkey during the Arab Spring,” Insight
Turkey 14, no. 3 (January 2012), 121–35. Although Israel and
Turkey have now settled the issue over the MV Mavi Marmara
flotilla incident and returned their respective ambassadors to each
other’s countries, signaling a return to normalcy, the honeymoon
that existed between them before 2002 is all but over because
of continued tensions over Gaza and alleged Israeli support for
Kurdish nationalist aspirations in the region.
19. Erin Cunningham, “Turkey Says Its Global Dragnet
Has Seized Dozens of Its Citizens in 18 Countries,” Washington
Post, April 4, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/turkey
-says-its-global-dragnet-has-seized-dozens-of-its-citizens-in-18
-countries/2018/04/05/3e4c144a-38d1-11e8-af3c-2123715f78df_story
.html.
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the country. Erdogan has even suggested exchanging
Brunson for Gulen.20
Brunson went on trial near Izmir on Monday,
April 16, 2018, and fully denied allegations that he
was involved in terrorist acts in Turkey or had tried
to convert Sunni Muslim Kurds to Christianity. The
Washington Post ran a short digest on the pending
trial in its morning edition on the day the trial started
and pointed out the legal defense fees for Brunson’s
trial were funded by Pat Robertson’s Christian organization, the American Center for Law and Justice,
a conservative Christian group in the United States.
The organization, which called Brunson a “hostage
of the Turkish government,” collected more than half
a million signatures on a petition, claiming the case
was putting Christianity on trial and thus provoking Turkey with perceived religious divisions. Press
reports from Turkey said the Turkish judge presiding
over the Brunson trial denied bail after the hearing,
citing the potential of his flight from Turkey. The Brunson case has moved US-Turkish relations to newly
heightened tensions after he was ordered to be transferred from jail to house arrest by an Istanbul court on
July 25, 2018. The reason tensions continued between
the two sides after the release of Brunson from jail and
his transfer to house arrest is because the US government expected him to be released and remanded to
the United States, not held in a house arrest status.
The United States has since insisted on his release
and return to his home country, but Turkey has
20. “America and Turkey Stop Issuing Visas,” Al-Hayat,
October 8, 2017, 1; and Barbara G. Baker, “Turkey: Date Set
for Trial of US Pastor Andrew Brunson,” World Watch Monitor, March 21, 2018, https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/2018/03
/turkey-date-set-trial-us-pastor-andrew-brunson/.
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refused, citing similar judicial constraints surrounding its request for Gulen’s extradition to Turkey. As a
result, the United States levied sanctions against two
Turkish government ministers. Turkey followed suit
and threatened to freeze assets in Turkey allegedly
belonging to two unidentified US cabinet secretaries.21
The question remains whether relations between
Turkey and the United States—who signed a memorandum of understanding in June 2018 that met a persistent Turkish demand to redeploy of YPG Kurdish
militia from Manbij—and the start of joint military
US-Turkish security patrols are now in jeopardy as a
result of the Brunson standoff. All indications are the
Brunson case is on hold pending further diplomatic
exchanges. The standoff may ultimately include an
exchange of prisoners held or convicted by both sides.
It is unlikely, however, any such deal would result in
the extradition of Gulen.22
21. Adam Goldman and Gardiner Harris, “US Imposes Sanctions on Turkish Officials over Detention of American Detained
Pastor,” New York Times, August 1, 2018, https://www.nytimes
.com/2018/08/01/world/europe/us-sanctions-turkey-pastor.html.
22. “Imprisoned American Pastor Andrew Brunson Rejects
Terror Charges in Turkey Trial,” Hurriyet Daily News, April
16, 2018, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/imprisoned-american
-pastor-andrew-brunson-rejects-terror-charges-in-turkey-trial-130365;
“Andrew Brunson, US Pastor, Moved to House Arrest in Turkey,”
New York Times, July 25, 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/07/25/world
/middleeast/andrew-brunson-turkey.html; “Turkey Ministers Shrug
Off US Sanctions Targeting Them,” Hurriyet Daily News, August
2, 2018, 1; Carol Morello and Shibani Mahtani, “Pompeo Warns
Turkey Clock Has Run Out to Release Jailed US Pastor,” Washington Post, August 3, 2018, A-8; “Turkey to Freeze Assets of
Two US Cabinet Secretaries As Retaliation to Sanctions: Erdogan,” Hurriyet Daily News, August 4, 2018, 1; “Kurdish Forces to
Withdraw from Syria’s Manbij under US-Turkey Deal,” France
24, June 6, 2018, www.france24.com/en/20180606-manbij-militia
-kurdish-ypg-syria-turkey-usa-assad; Karen De Young, “Senior US,
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The US Department of State (DoS) has asked
Turkey to stop playing “hostage politics” with Brunson and other Western nationals. “We have seen no
credible evidence that Mr. Brunson is guilty of a crime
and are convinced that he is innocent,” said State
Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert on April
16, 2018.23 This phrase has been echoed by Brunson’s
supporters and the Trump administration, including
Vice President Pence, who has taken a special interest
in the Brunson case given his evangelical leanings.24
ERDOGAN AND THE POWER REFERENDUM
Another irritant in US-Turkish-NATO relations
is the Turkish state of emergency still in place since
the failed coup attempt in July 2016. According to
US officials, Erdogan is structurally altering the traditionally secular and pro-Western-leaning political
dynamics of Turkey’s political system to bolster his
presidential power under the pretext of national security and threats to Turkey from outside the country.
His effort to codify these powers in a national referendum gained more traction following its narrow 51
percent passage on April 16, 2017.25 The outcome gave
Turkish Officials to Meet over Dispute about Minister’s Detention,” Washington Post, August 7, 2018, A-2; and Zeynep Bilginsoy
and Mehmet Guzel, “US Pastor Faces Terror Charges in Fraught
Trial in Turkey,” Associated Press, April 15, 2018, https://www
.apnews.com/67d9fb2227d9444f9b0fc92e52362625.
23. Heather Nauert, “Department Press Briefing” (speech,
DoS, Washington, DC, July 18, 2018); ranking officers at the DoS;
and Heather Nauert, “Department Press Briefing” (speech, DoS,
Washington, DC, April 16, 2018).
24. Ranking officers at the DoS.
25. Alexandra Topping, “Turkey Referendum: Erdogan Wins
Vote Amid Dispute Over Ballots—As It Happened,” Guardian,
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Erdogan additional powers over the Turkish armed
forces, the cabinet, judges, and prosecutors, whom
Erdogan has accused of siding with Gulen in the past.
Support for the referendum was not strong, even
among Erdogan’s supporters. Major urban centers in
Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, traditionally AKP strongholds, all voted against the referendum. With only 51
percent in favor, the results indicated (1) a surprising
dissension within the AKP’s rank-and-file supporters; (2) continuing fragmentation and divisions within
Turkey’s political parties; (3) a continuing public perception that the AKP actually lost the popular vote
on the referendum; and (4) Turkey was moving farther away from the democratic EU, so its chances of
joining the EU may be lost, even if they were unlikely
anyway. Erdogan believes the presidential and parliamentary elections that took place on June 24, 2018,
gave him the full mandate he sought to consolidate
his grip on power and achieve his overall political
dream of keeping his domestic and foreign political
enemies weak and disorganized. This guarantees him
the opportunity to remain in power at least until 2023,
the important anniversary of the establishment of the
Turkish republic, successor to the Ottoman Empire.
He won 52.5 percent of the popular vote, and his AKP
won 53.6 percent, the highest percentages since 2002.
In sum, the June 24, 2018, elections and national referendum went Erdogan’s way. As a result, the AKP and
Erdogan today feel vindicated, empowered, and willing to take more political risks, as he is currently doing
with the standoff with the United States.
In the meantime, the United States continues
to view Turkey as moving closer each day toward
April 16, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2017/apr/16
/turkey-referendum-recep-tayyip-erdogan-votes-presidential-powers.
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dictatorship through public referendums and violations of democratic norms. Officials within the US
interagency system have stressed Erdogan is successfully creating a structural problem domestically by
eliminating any semblance of accountability and oversight. There are no checks on the president’s power
any longer—a sure sign democracy in Turkey is on
the wane. Erdogan responds by using scare tactics to
mobilize the vast majority of his supporters against
the United States.
His ardent AKP supporters point out that Erdogan
was responsible for the 8–9 percent annual economic
growth between 2002 and 2011, which brought Turkey
unprecedented prosperity and global influence.
Turkey, they argue, has continued to be a target of
conspiracies and territorial dismemberment by great
powers ever since it lost the Great War because of its
ill-fated alliance with Germany in 1914.
Erdogan is simply continuing the legacy of Ataturk, who was favored by many Western powers,
including the United States, for his neutrality in World
War II and for laying the foundation of secularism
that has since become the hallmark of Turkey’s political system. Erdogan—like Ataturk—invokes Turkish
nationalism and Ottoman-style revivalism along with
a strong centralized leadership to protect Turkey’s
territorial integrity and sovereignty against outsiders,
allies, and foes alike. The difference between Ataturk
and Erdogan is the latter rose to power with the help
of conservative, Muslim, grassroots, Anatolian-based
farmers and lower- and lower-middle-class city dwellers. These groups had long been disenfranchised and
politically alienated from the political and economic
Kemalist military and the economic elite Ataturk created to safeguard his newly founded secular republic.
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Turkish Islamic identity helped Ataturk establish
his liberal system of governance because his society
followed the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence,
the most liberal of all four orthodox Sunni schools.
This may be one of the reasons why Turkey—unlike
Iran—can never become a theocracy. It is worth noting
Turkish secularism did not mean the end of religion as
a fact of life in Turkish society; rather, it was an effort
by the Kemalists to bring Islam under direct and total
control of the state.
Erdogan wants to fuse Kemalist, secular, nationalist ideas with Islamic and Ottoman ones, drawing
heavily on Ottoman history and culture, unlike Ataturk. Erdogan understands Kemalist secular ideas
remain a potent force among at least half of Turkey’s
voting society, and he uses his co-optation skills to bolster his legitimacy as the true embodiment of Ataturk’s
nationalist legacy. This style of leadership is authoritarian and autocratic. It embodies strength and decisiveness and plays to specific segments of the Turkish
public. In the case of Kemal, it was directed in favor of
secular, nonreligious, minority elements. In the case of
Erdogan, it favors a conservative Islamic constituency
that has managed to keep Erdogan’s political party in
power since 2002 through the ballot box.
Erdogan is also careful not to challenge Ataturk’s
style of leadership in public for that reason. Ironically,
Erdogan often denies he is building a new authoritarian Islamic system in Turkey, saying that Turkish
voters can at any time deny him and his political party
power by voting against them in periodic and snap
local and national elections.
Erdogan often uses other forms of scare tactics and
conspiracy theories to keep his most ardent supporters in line and to reinforce his hold on power. He gave
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a major policy speech on November 8, 2017, in which he
warned his countrymen that Turkey is going through the
most sensitive phase of its existence since independence
in 1923. He said the events over the last five years indicate
Turkey faced domestic- and foreign-hatched conspiracies
using terror organizations and threats to strike at the heart
of the Turkish state and pride. His attacks on the Turkish
press have also been severe, all in the name of protecting
national security and territorial integrity.26
THE RUSSIAN FACTOR
A major current irritant in US-Turkish-NATO relations is Turkey’s rapprochement with Russia, which has
evolved since the Syrian Civil War. Historically, Russia
and Turkey have had a contentious relationship, as the
Muslim Ottoman Empire bordered Russia in the predominantly Muslim Caucasus region and challenged Russia’s
26. “Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Turkey’s Pugnacious President,” BBC
News, June 24, 2017; Mark Lowen, “Erdogan’s Turkey,” BBC News, April
13, 2017; “Erdogan Considers Turkey Going Through Its Most Sensitive
Phases since Independence,” Al-Hayat, November 8, 2017; Aley Cinar,
“The Justice and Development Party: Turkey’s Experience with Islam,
Democracy, Liberalism, and Secularism,” International Journal of Middle
East Studies 43, no. 3 (August 2011): 529–41; and “Attacks on the Record:
The State of Global Press Freedom, 2017–2018,” Freedom House,
2018,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/attacks-record-state
-global-press-freedom-2017-2018. This study points out that Turkey
“remained the world’s worst jailer of journalists, with 73 behind bars
as of December, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists. The
government permanently blocked Wikipedia in late April 2017, and
17 journalists from an opposition newspaper were tried on charges of
aiding a terrorist organization. Following the June 24, 2018, successful
AKP-sponsored referendum on changing the Turkish Constitution to
a presidential system, President Erdogan ordered the dismissal of over
8,000 public officials, academics, journalists, and police and military
officers. Associated Press, “Turkey Fires Thousands of State Employees in Anti-Terror Purges,” Guardian, July 8, 2018, 1.
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hegemony in the Balkans and elsewhere. As Turkey
realized the Assad regime could not be toppled
because of Russia’s military support and as a result of
the US shift in strategy toward defeating ISIS, a tactical realignment between Russia and Turkey became
more attractive. The catalyst was the November 28,
2015, downing of a Russian all-weather SU-24 aircraft
close to Turkey’s border by a Turkish F-16 warplane
using American-made air-to-air missiles. Russian
President Vladimir Putin condemned Turkey’s action
and denied the Russian aircraft had penetrated Turkish airspace. He subsequently demanded an apology
and immediately ordered a boycott of Turkish goods
and services, including trade and tourism, a major
source of national income for Turkey.27
The downed Russian jet had just completed a
bombing sortie against pro-Turkish Syrian rebels. The
Russian plane crashed in the mountainous Jabal Turkmen area of the Syrian province of Latakia, which is
contested by the Syrian government and Syrian rebel
militia. Erdogan stressed that shooting down the Russian jet was fully in-line with Turkey’s rules of engagement and defense posture, which were put in place
after Syria shot down a Turkish jet in 2012. These rules
state all unauthorized flying “elements” approaching
from Syria are considered hostile aircraft.
The Russian boycott of Turkey was gradually
lifted, but not before it took a major toll on the Turkish economy, which has been heavily dependent on
Russia since at least 2005. Russian sanctions affected
Turkish tourism, construction firms, and food exports
after Russia banned the import of Turkish fruit,
27. “Turkey Shoots Down Russian Warplane on Syrian
Border,” BBC News, November 24, 2015, https://www.bbc.com
/news/world-middle-east-34907983.
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vegetables, poultry, and salt, the sale of Turkish charter holidays to Russians, and construction projects
with Turkish firms in Russia unless a special exemption was granted. More importantly, Russia halted
talks about building nuclear power plants in Turkey
originally designed to improve Turkish energy capacity, which was heavily dependent on outside sources.
Russia suspended work on TurkStream, a new
Black Sea pipeline that was to bolster Russian gas
imports to Turkey at a time when Turkey imported
about 53–55 percent of its gas from Russia. Russia also
imposed restrictions on Turkish citizens working for
companies registered in Russia and on exchange students studying in both countries. The Russian boycott
risked Turkey losing $3.5 billion annually in income
from Russian tourists, $4.5 billion annually through
the cancellation of construction projects, and 20 percent of trade. Moreover, the declining value of the
Russian ruble caused Turkish businessmen another
60 percent loss in revenues because Turkish goods
became more expensive in Russia. Turkey was forced
to look for new markets to make up these huge losses,
so it turned to Iran and African countries, where competition with China was fierce. It was only a matter of
time before Turkey was forced to use its traditional
political economy and soft-power approach to resolve
its standoff with Russia.28
Today, Russia’s relations with Turkey have dramatically improved, as evidenced by the record 4.7
million Russian tourists who visited Turkey in 2017
28. Selin Girit, “Turkey Faces Big Losses as Russia Sanctions Bite,” BBC News, January 2, 2016, www.bbc.com/news/world
-europe-35209987; and Gulmira Rzayeva, Gas Supply Changes in
Turkey (Oxford, UK: Oxford Institute For Energy Studies, 2018),
1–19.
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and the April 3, 2018, symbolic inauguration of a
groundbreaking ceremony for Turkey’s first nuclear
power plant on the Mediterranean coast at Akkuyu
despite some remaining technical glitches. The deal
is the result of a joint-venture economic and energy
partnership with Russia’s atomic energy conglomerate, Rosatom, which holds 51 percent to Turkey’s 49
percent stake in the joint venture. Turkey also has the
option of building nine more nuclear power plants
with Russia. Akkuyu is slated to provide 10 percent of
Turkey’s electricity needs when in full operation.29
Turkey, Iran, and Russia have also been moving
closer together on a peace plan for Syria as part of the
so-called Astana process between the Assad regime
and his disparate Syrian rebel rivals, which runs
counter to the US-, NATO-, and UN-supported peace
talks in Geneva, Switzerland. The Geneva talks have
stalled because of deep divisions among all players.
Turkey insists on fully excluding the US-supported
Syrian Democratic Forces and their Kurdish YPG and
PKK affiliates, preventing them from gaining legitimacy for their causes at the peace table in Geneva.
The Russian-sponsored Astana process aims to satisfy Turkey’s veto against Kurdish participation in
any peace talks while the Geneva Peace Talks keep
the door open for a Kurdish role in the final outcome
of Syria’s Civil War. The Kurds hold large swaths of
Syrian territory won from ISIS in 2017 with help from
the US-led NATO military coalition. Both the Astana

29. “Russia Starts Building Turkey’s First Nuclear Power
Plant,” World Nuclear News, April 3, 2018, http://www.world
-nuclear-news.org/NN-Russia-starts-building-Turkeys-first-nuclear
-power-plant-03041801.html.
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process and the Geneva Peace Talks have been ongoing since 2012.30
Russia insists that Astana is not a substitute to the
Geneva talks, but something that could help move
them both forward, especially because the Geneva
track has stalled. A high-level summit between Presidents Rouhani of Iran, Putin, and Erdogan on April
4, 2018, in Ankara to discuss Syria was designed to
convey unity of purpose, but, in reality, was a photo
op that achieved little progress. Turkey’s relations
with Russia and Iran, although driven by energy and
economic factors, are justified by Ankara on the basis
Turkey must engage with all of its neighbors to keep
an eye on their regional intentions and capabilities,
especially in regard to national security issues affecting Turkey and for economic reasons that directly
impact its survival. Turkey simply wants to maintain
its open-door policy to bolster its vital and growing
trade relations with Tehran and Moscow and to elicit
their help in resolving frozen and protracted conflicts
in Turkey’s region, especially in Armenia, Azerbaijan,
30. “Russia’s Lavrov, FM Cavusoglu to Discuss Planned
Four-Way Syria Summit,” Daily Sabah, August 13, 2018, 2. Though
it is contrary to US strategic goals, Turkey’s desired outcome from
the Astana process is an uncertain and precarious alliance among
Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Turkey’s strategy in this alliance is to
leverage as much political concessions and influence as possible should a political settlement on Syria emerge in the future.
The United States has been attempting to achieve similar objectives through the Geneva Peace Talks, but with a strategic outcome more favorable to the Western nation. The peace talks have
been stalemated over the Syrian regime’s refusal to recognize
the political rights and grievances of the Turkish-backed Syrian
rebel delegation, which the Damascus regime continues to label
as a terrorist group. The Syrian regime’s bellicose reaction, which
has been ongoing since the uprising began in 2011, is designed to
render the rebel political cause illegitimate.
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and Georgia. Turkey’s strategic perspective toward
Russia and Iran revolves around remaining relevant
and keeping an eye on what they are doing in the
region. Turkey does not want to be drawn into an
Arab-Iranian, sectarian, Sunni-Shia, religious conflict.
Turkey is concerned about Iran but does not want
to confront it given current peaceful coexistence and
extensive bilateral trade ties since at least the beginning of the twentieth century.
Turkey, Russia, and Iran continue to exhibit divergent, strategic objectives in Syria on the final status
of President Assad of Syria as well as on the NATO
and US retaliation against Syrian chemical facilities
on April 14, 2018. Iran and Russia condemned the air
attacks, but Turkey did not, saying more is needed to
punish Assad for his use of chemical weapons against
his civilian population in Douma, near Damascus.31
Russia went as far as denying any culpability in the
chemical attack on Douma or the use of chemical
agents prior to the NATO-US retaliatory air strikes.
The new Russian ambassador in Ankara repeated
the denial chemical agents were used and said the
accusations were nothing more than a propaganda
campaign against Russia. The ambassador also denied
Russia’s culpability in the nerve-gas attack on a retired
KGB agent and his daughter living in Salisbury,
31. “Turkey Welcomes US-Led Strikes Targeting Assad
Regime in Syria,” Hurriyet Daily News, April 15, 2018, 1. According to this article, the Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying, “The Syrian regime, which has been tyrannizing its
own people for more than seven years, be it with conventional or
chemical weapons, has a proven track record of crimes against
humanity and [other] war crimes.” This statement came only a
week after the much-publicized presidential Ankara summit
between Erdogan, Rouhani, and Putin.
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England.32 The Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons issued an interim fact-finding
mission report on July 6, 2016, saying it did not find
evidence of chemical use in Douma on April 7, 2018,
or in Al-Hamdaniya or Karam al-Tarrab on October
30, 2016, and November 13, 2016, respectively. In an
earlier report, the organization confirmed the use of a
chemical agent in the Salisbury attack but could not
pinpoint its source.33
One of the most controversial problems facing
Turkey-US-NATO relations, however, centers on the
proposed sale and transfer of the Russian S-400 missile to Turkey. Turkey signed an accord with Russia
in December 2017 to supply it with the S-400 surface-to-air missile batteries, hoping this was a first
step toward an eventual joint venture to produce
the missile in Turkey. The S-400 Triumph is based
on an earlier Russian S-300 version, but reportedly

32. Ali Unal, “Interview with New Russian Ambassador to
Turkey, Aleksey Yerhov: Bilateral Relations Based on Win-Win
Principle,” Daily Sabah, April 16, 2018, https://www.dailysabah.
com/diplomacy/2018/04/16/russian-ambassador-to-ankara-aleksey
-yerhov-turkey-russia-bilateral-relations-based-on-win-win-principle;
and Malik Kaylan, “The Summit Meeting in Ankara Between
Russia, Turkey, and Iran: What It Means For The Region,” Forbes,
April 6, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/melikkaylan/2018/04/06
/the-summit-meeting-in-ankara-between-russia-turkey-iran-what-it
-means-for-the-region/#50d20a2515eb.
33. “OPC Issues Fact Finding Mission Report on Chemical Weapons Use Allegations in Douma, Syria in 2018 and in
Al-Hamadaniya and Karm Al Tarrab in 2016,” Organization for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, July 6, 2018, https://www
.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2018/07/opcw-issues-fact-finding
-mission-reports-chemical-weapons-use-allegations; and “Chemical
Watchdog Confirms UK Findings on Salisbury Nerve Agent,” UN
News, April 18, 2018, https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/04/1007642.
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has more sophisticated electronic gear capabilities.34
Both NATO and the United States oppose this sale
to Turkey on political and technical grounds. On the
surface and politically, the Turkey-Russia deal sends
a message that Turkey is abandoning its commitment
to stay within NATO—a major complaint in the US
Congress—but technically, it raises many important
issues concerning interoperability and weapon and
doctrine integration within existing and future NATO
military platforms as well as trust issues regarding
whether NATO’s secret weapon systems and platforms would be compromised due to Turkey’s bend
toward Russia.35 Moreover, Turkey is using the S-400
issue to press the United States and NATO to support
its evolving anti-Kurdish strategy in the region as a
whole. In a major policy speech on March 27, 2018,
Turkey’s Defense Minister, Nurettin Canikli, tried to
deflect Western and US criticisms over Turkey’s quest
to purchase the S-400 system, pointing out the Russian missile deal does not compete with other US and
NATO platforms, including the proposed sale of the
American F-35 fighter jet to Turkey. Ironically, the US
Senate voted on July 24, 2018, to delay delivery of the
coveted F-35 jets to Turkey by a vote of 87 to 10, perhaps in retaliation for Turkey’s perceived departure
34. David Brennan, “What Is the S-400? The Russian Anti-Aircraft Weapon Dividing NATO,” Newsweek, March 12, 2018, www
.newsweek.com/what-s400-russian-anti-aircraft-weapon-nato-840046.
35. “Russia behind US-Turkey Tensions, US General Claims,”
Sabah Daily, March 14, 2018. A commander of the Kurdish YPG,
the leading Kurdish militia within the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, stated that “Russia betrayed the Kurds.” Russia’s
relationship with the Kurds has never been based on long-term,
strategic cooperation. On the contrary, throughout its history,
Moscow has used the Kurdish card only when it needed to reach
a compromise with the countries in the Middle East.
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from its traditional Western and US strategic and
operational commitments.36
On the surface, the issue of the S-400 sale to Turkey
appears straightforward as far as Turkey is concerned,
but it is not. According to interviews with officials
from the Departments of State and Defense in March
2018, Turkey has tried to convince the United States
and its NATO allies to allow it full control and joint
production of the equivalent Patriot missile system.
This would require transferring highly guarded technical secrets and special codes associated with manufacturing the American Patriot missile platform
system to Turkey.
Turkey hopes a joint US-Turkish-NATO venture
to manufacture the Patriot in Turkey would add to
its growing arms sales industry as well as its regional
and global prestige and influence. NATO and the
United States have rejected the Turkish demand but
seem to be seeking other ways to satisfy Turkey’s
quest to enhance its technical arms superiority while
keeping it within NATO’s collective defense and security frameworks. In the meantime, Russia and Turkey
are still negotiating the S-400 terms, and it is not clear
whether Russia will follow suit in refusing to share
highly guarded technical data for the S-400 system
with Turkey or any other state.
NATO, the United States, and Russia want to keep
Turkey dependent on them for weapon platform
purchases and as a means to manage their separate
36. “Purchase of Russian S-400 Does Not Affect Purchase of
American F-35,” Hurriyet Daily News, March 27, 2018, 1; Ranking
officers at the DoS; Ranking officers at the DoD; “US Senate
Approves Decision to Delay Delivery of the F-35 Jets to Turkey,”
Daily Sabah, August 2, 2018, https://www.dailysabah.com/
defense/2018/08/02/us-senate-approves-decision-to-delay-delivery-of
-f-35-jets-to-turkey.
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relations with Ankara. Russia in particular fears that
Turkey may end up selling the S-400 weapon system
to Russia’s nemeses, Ukraine, Georgia, and Afghanistan, which it seems would upset the regional balance of power and upend frozen conflicts at Russia’s
expense.
Nevertheless, Russia has embarked on a major
public relations charm campaign since December 2017,
despite the conflict between Turkey and itself over the
most important, remaining, divisive, political issue—
namely, the long-term fate of President Assad. Turkey
still wants Assad to be removed from office, but Russia
insists on keeping him in place. Russia’s charm offensive seems to be softening the country’s relations with
Turkey. A year after the 2016 assassination of the Russian ambassador in Ankara, Turkey-Russia relations
have improved markedly.37
Turkey’s original, short-term aim to acquire
the S-400 is linked to its quest to develop a reliable
surface-to-air missile system because of its current
combat-ready pilot shortages. This means the Russian
missile would be deployed in place of its fighter aircraft as a temporary measure until perhaps new pilots
were fully trained and ready for deployment in theater
operations. The main challenge Turkey would face in
deploying the S-400 is “interoperability with existing
NATO integrated air and missile defense systems.”38
37. Ali Unal, “Interview with Russian Ambassador.” In
addition to thanking the Russian president for Russia’s UN vote
against the US resolution to move the US embassy from Tel Aviv
to Jerusalem in December 2017, Erdogan made a similar gesture
toward the Vatican. “Erdogan, Pope Francis Back Jerusalem’s
Status during Vatican Talks,” Daily Sabah, February 5, 2018, 1.
38. For an excellent assessment of Turkey’s multilevel
challenges of integrating its S-400 system, see Can Kasapoglu,
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TURKEY’S EVOLVING ARMED FORCES
As the United States and NATO reach a critical
juncture in their relationship with Turkey, it is worth
pointing out that Turkey, despite its NATO membership, has been the odd man out. Despite its sacrifices
during the Cold War to serve transatlantic interests
against communism in the Middle East, the Korean
Peninsula, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, Turkey never
felt it got the appreciation or credit it deserved from
its NATO partners. This can be attributed to three factors. The first is historical factors related to the former
Muslim caliphate (the Ottoman Empire) and its troubled relationship with the West beginning in the early
nineteenth century and ending with the loss of its
empire following its defeat by Allied forces during
the Great War. The Armenian Genocide, the War of
Greek Independence, and the fate of Turkey’s Greek
minorities did not help improve Turkey’s image
despite efforts by the founder of the modern Turkish
republic to mend fences with Europe through neutrality and friendship arrangements before and during
the Second World War and its aftermath. Second,
Turkey has cultural and religious differences with its
NATO partners. The more Turkey tried to integrate
within the European cultural theater, the more it was
shunned. The United States tried as an honest broker
to support Turkey’s inclusion in Western Europe to
safeguard NATO and preserve its collective security
mission against Soviet, and later Russian, penetration and aggression. Finally, the nature of the Turkish
“Turkey’s S-400 Dilemma,” EDAM Centre for Economics and
Foreign Policy Studies, July 1, 2017; and Nurlam Aliev, “Russia’s
Arms Sales: A Foreign Policy Tool in Relations with Azerbaijan
and Armenia,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 15, no. 47 (March 20, 2018).
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military under the new republic in 1923 and beyond
sets Turkey apart. Until 2002, the secular Turkish military controlled the civilian democratic process and
saw itself as the guardian of Kemalist ideas against
mostly domestic enemies of the state—namely, unruly
Turkish political parties bent on political violence to
achieve domestic political ends as well as political
Islam. It was not unusual, however, for the Turkish
military to use Islam against extreme leftist ideologies
during the Cold War to keep both sides off-balance.
Turkish secularism under its founder, Ataturk,
resembled the French laïcité system (referred to as
“Liklik” in Turkey) of preventing the influence of religion in political matters.39 Due to domestic, public
pressures after Ataturk’s death in 1938, however, the
state coopted Islamic institutions and clerics through
Diyanat, Turkey’s religious foundation, especially in
rural areas where Islam remained entrenched. Religion thereby came under the direct control of the state,
transforming the previous total separation between
the state and society at large. Thus, starting in the
1950s, religion and Islam in particular were managed
by the Kemalist military not as a theocracy, but as a
vehicle for the political mobilization of secularized
institutions under Western-oriented military rule and
as a hedge against extreme political movements left
39. Ahmet Kuru and Alfred Stepan, Democracy, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012),
4–5, 102–111. This reference refers directly to the concept of laïcité
and its application in Turkey. For additional discussion of secularism and Islam in Turkey following the establishment of the
Turkish republic, see Pope and Pope, Turkey Unveiled, 65–69; Stephen Kinzer, Crescent and Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds (New
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008), 42–43; and Andrew Finkel,
Turkey: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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and right of center. Even today, the fine line between
religion and state remains more or less unchanged.
In short, laïcité in Turkey has been anything but rigidly practiced. Islam under the Turkish system, while
a central part of the fabric of Turkish society, must
always be controlled and managed by the state and its
predominantly secular institutions.
The Turkish state controls the religious institutions and Muslim clerics in Turkey, including the
Imam Hatip schools and associated foundations. This
system started under Ataturk, but continues to this
day. Under Kemalism, the government maintained
full control over religious affairs through Diyanat as
well as over all ethnic and religious minorities by the
military-dominated National Security Council that
oversaw the day-to-day ruling of the state through
state-of-emergency proclamations, constitutional declarations, and military coups from 1960 until 2002.
This state of affairs did not sit well with Turkey’s
Western allies within NATO or the United States,
who advocated more transparent and liberal democratic practices, including full civilian control over the
military. But this was overlooked during most of the
Cold War in favor of preserving Turkey’s active support and membership within NATO against the Soviet
Union.40
The closest Turkey came to resolving these contentious issues was in 2002 with the rise of Erdogan
and his AKP. For over 10 years under AKP leadership,
Turkey enjoyed a honeymoon with Europe and the
United States. The military, however, lost power to
the civilians through the ballot box and was severely
purged and weakened. As a result, the United States
40. Pope and Pope, Turkey Unveiled, 180–97; Kinzer, Crescent
and Star, 213–28; and Finkel, Turkey, 68–105.
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and NATO touted Turkey’s moderate Islam as a
model to be emulated by Muslims throughout the
Middle East and North Africa. The honeymoon was
precarious at best.
Turkey’s differences with Western NATO allies
intensified following the Arab popular uprisings of
2011 over strategic and operational issues. Strategically, Turkey wanted to avoid the economic and
security fallout of regime change that NATO and the
United States favored. Instead, it gravitated toward
bringing about internal political reform through its
support for domestic pressure groups and antiregime
militia. Operationally, Turkey was worried about
losing control of the fluid situations following military interventions by NATO and other outside players, citing the instability following the overthrow of
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Saddam Hussein’s
regime in Iraq, and the Gadhafi regime in Libya.
At the same time, Erdogan set out to weaken his
domestic political opponents, but the increasingly
authoritarian nature of his policies and his effort to
idolize Islam as a great religion did not sit well in
Western Europe and the United States, who were reeling from a spike in al-Qaeda- and ISIS-inspired terror
attacks. Turkish officers within NATO were instructed
to challenge their European counterparts on the use
of the term “Islamic terrorism,” which caused a great
deal of tension between the traditionally professional,
nonpoliticized NATO officers.41
41. This is based on the author’s firsthand observation of
the contentious debate between NATO officers detailed to the
NATO Intelligence Center in the UK on the propriety of linking
the word “Islam” with terrorist activities. Turkish officers were
instructed by their government to challenge their Western European NATO allied officers’ counterparts on this issue and to insist
on developing a neutral definitional lexicon to be used in NATO
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More importantly for NATO and the EU, Erdogan’s
neo-Ottoman nationalist synthesis couched in Turkish
Islamic national slogans and agitation in Western European capitals did not fare well. Tensions have risen in
many Western European capitals, including Germany,
Austria, and the Netherlands, since the spring of 2017
over the Turkish government’s insistence on holding
large rallies of its supporters in Europe against Gulen
and the Kurdish PKK-led insurgency in Syria and
Iraq. In response, EU officials refused to issue permits
for the rallies and Turkish officials, including Foreign
Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, were barred from traveling to deliver rally speeches.42
The EU promised to restart coveted accession
talks with Turkey for EU membership in 2005, only to
intelligence publications for the definition of “terrorism,” free
from any religious, Islamic connotation. The author was invited
to lead a series of seminars to help bridge the cultural and linguistic differences between Western European and Turkish officers detailed to the center in the UK; Julian E. Barnes and David
Gauthier-Villars, “NATO Apologizes for Offending Turkey,” Wall
Street Journal, November 17, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/nato
-apologizes-for-offending-turkey-1510941321; “Looking at the map
is enough to see Turkey’s importance NATO Secretary General
Jens Stoltenberg Says,” Hurriyet Daily News, April 30, 2018; “Jihad
Not Related to Terrorism, Turkish FM Davutoglu Says,” Hurriyet
Daily News, February 18, 2013, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com
/jihad-not-related-to-terrorism-turkish-fm-davutoglu-says-41322; and
“Turkey Slams EU’s Top Diplomat over Afrin Remarks,” Hurriyet
Daily News, March 19, 2018.
42. Oren Dorell and John Bacon, “Turkey’s President Says
‘Nazism is Alive in the West,’” USA Today, March 13, 2017, 3-A;
and Omer Taspinar, “The End of the Turkish Model,” Survival 56,
no. 2 (April-May 2014): 49–64. For a detailed analysis of the AKP
model, see Natalie Tocci et al., Turkey and the Arab Spring: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy from a Transatlantic Perspective,
German Marshall Fund of the United States, October 31, 2011,
18–21.
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declare once again that Turkey was no longer being
considered for membership. Repeated US pressure
on the EU to admit Turkey was met with resistance
from its transatlantic member partners. American
support for Turkey’s inclusion in the EU is based on
its consistent goal of preserving NATO’s cohesion in
the face of increasing threats and vulnerabilities from
Russian and Iranian influence as well as terrorist
organizations.43
Today, Turkey’s military structure continues to
evolve into a unilateral entity farther away from
NATO’s original doctrine of collective defense, collective security, and joint integrated weapon platforms.
The Turkish Defense Ministry announced on March
25, 2018, that the long-awaited debut of Turkey’s light
aircraft carrier was approaching. The vessel, the construction of which began in 2016, is intended to meet
“various needs of the Turkish armed forces such as
sustaining long-endurance, long distance military
combat or humanitarian operations.”44
The ongoing transformation of the Turkish armed
forces will affect NATO and the United States in more
ways than one. The secular, Western-oriented identity
that prevailed from 1923 to 2002 is being dismantled,
which could further “exacerbate ideological and political factionalism within the officers’ corps according
43. The EU acknowledges Turkey was one of the first states
that applied to join the union in 1959 beyond the original founder
states, but argues today Turkey still is not a liberal democracy
and President Erdogan is subverting the rule of law and accountability by continuing to invoke the state of emergency and rule by
decree following the failed coup in July 2016, which runs contrary
to the EU’s basic democratic standards.
44. Robert Farley, “Will Turkey Really Get an Aircraft Carrier
Armed with F35s?,” National Interest, February 21, 2019.
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to a new study.”45 The study states Erdogan is consolidating his grip on the armed forces and bringing
them under his direct command. His quest to weed
out Gulen and other old, secular, Kemalist tendencies
is ongoing and appears to have been successful so far,
especially since the failed 2016 coup. Erdogan is using
the attempted coup of July 2016 to purge the Turkish
armed forces and to bring them under his total control. He is cognizant of the history of the armed forces
coups and argues the armed forces prior to the July
attempted coup were infiltrated by Gulen supporters and Gulen himself was responsible for instigating
the failed coup—hence, his repeated requests to the
United States to extradite Gulen back to Turkey to
stand trial for his role in the coup.
The study also highlights the significant challenges
Turkey is likely to face in the near future as a result of
this coerced transformation: (1) shortages of qualified
pilots; (2) shortages in fully trained and equipped man
power; (3) new officers being indoctrinated more in
conservative nationalist and religious doctrines than
their predecessors were; (4) an officer corps that is
more representative of the Turkish society as a whole;
and (5) more civilian control over the military, as is the
norm in Western democracies, including the United
States.46
45. For an excellent assessment of the current transformation of the Turkish Armed Forces, see Lars Haugom, An Uncertain Future. Also see Lars Haugom, “The Turkish Armed Forces
and Civil-Military Relations in Turkey after the 15 July 2016 Coup
Attempt,” Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 2, no. 1 (January
15, 2019): 1–8.
46. For an excellent assessment of the current transformation
of the Turkish Armed Forces, see Lars Haugom, An Uncertain
Future.

47

TURKEY AND AMERICA’S GULF ALLIES’
COMPETING EXPECTATIONS
Like all other regional and international players
in the Syrian Civil War, the strategic objectives of the
gulf states evolved as the war continued. In the early
stages of the civil war, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the
UAE were in sync with the United States and Turkey
on the need for regime change and the removal of
President Assad from power. Saudi Arabia had been
unhappy with Syrian culpability in the assassination
of its Muslim Sunni Lebanese client, Prime Minister
Rafiq Hariri, by Syrian agents in Lebanon on February
14, 2005. But the kingdom was more concerned with
continued Syrian interference and influence in the
political dynamics of Lebanon, and more importantly,
its cozying up with predominantly Shia Iran and its
sponsorship of the politically powerful Lebanese Shia
Hezbollah movement, which was vehemently anti-Israel and anti-Sunni Arab gulf states. In short, Saudi
Arabia was a regional rival of Iran in Lebanon and
viewed Assad’s departure as an important means to
reducing Iranian influence in Lebanon since Iran was
the main source and benefactor of Hezbollah’s rising
influence in that state. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain also
worried about the expanding Iranian influence among
their ethnic Shia population, whom they considered to
be subversive elements and regime dissidents.
Syria under Assad received Iranian financial aid
and discounted oil and gas in return for supporting
the Iranian clerical regime in Tehran and Qom and
for allowing shipments of Iranian arms and training
personnel to freely transit Syria to Lebanon.47 Qatar
47. Karim Sajadpour, “Iran’s Real Enemy in Syria,” Atlantic,
April 16, 2018.
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was also viewed as a rival to Saudi Arabia in Lebanon following its successful effort to broker a ceasefire deal in its capital in May 2008, after fierce clashes
in Beirut between Sunni militia associated with Hariri
and Saudi Arabia on one hand, and Hezbollah and
its patron, Iran, on the other.48 Saudi Arabia viewed
the Qatar-sponsored cease-fire in Lebanon in 2008 as
an interference in its affairs and has resented it since.
Ironically, Saudi Arabia and Qatar share the same
conservative Sunni Islamic beliefs. But Iran and Qatar
share rich maritime gas fields within a few nautical
miles of each other, necessitating at least a working
relationship between the neighbors.
As the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) took control
of Egyptian politics through the ballot in 2012 after
the fall of President Mubarak, Saudi Arabia and the
UAE embarked on a major campaign to confront the
Brotherhood, fearing that its populist win would cascade into their backyard and ultimately lead to similar
uprisings or demands for political change. As a result,
Turkey and Qatar, who were sympathetic to the MB
and other associated movements, united to form a
front, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE countered by
supporting the overthrow of the freely elected MB
government by the Egyptian military on July 4, 2013.
The lines had been drawn. Turkey and Qatar opposed
the new military regime in Egypt, while Saudi Arabia
and the UAE supported it.
The rise of ISIS and the success of its military campaigns in Iraq and Syria in June 2014 and Russia’s
military intervention in September 2015 prompted
48. Alistair Lyon, “Qatar Pulls off Mediation Coup in Lebanon Crisis,” Reuters, May 22, 2008; Sultan Barakat, Qatari Mediation: Between Ambition and Achievement, Brookings Doha Center
Analysis Paper 12 (November 2014).
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change in the realignment and strategic objectives of
the players in the Syrian Civil War. While the United
States focused on defeating ISIS in Syria and Iraq,
Saudi Arabia and the UAE were busy realigning themselves to confront ISIS symbolically in Syria as well as
in Shia Iran, its Lebanese Hezbollah client, the Shia of
Iraq, and the MB in the Greater Middle East.49 The last
was seen as a revolutionary threat to the conservative
monarchies and their tribal offshoots in the Persian
Gulf, given its political success against Mubarak—a
long-time ally of these Arab gulf regimes.
Besides the MB, the Shia-Sunni die was cast as an
existential threat to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. For
Qatar, gulf security and stability necessitated closer
economic and political ties with Iran. For Turkey,
the threat remained the Kurds. Neither Turkey nor
Qatar want to embark on a sectarian conflict with Iran,
regardless of the countries who support it.50 These
49. Although relations among Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi
Arabia are at a low ebb because of Turkey’s perceived support for
Hamas and President Morsi of Egypt, formerly of the MB, they
have not reached the level of public hostility and suspicion that
exists today between the UAE and Turkey. Whereas in March of
2013 UAE-Turkey trade relations reached Dh33.3 billion (approximately nine billion US dollars), in total value today they are at
a trickle, and overall relations are at a stalemate. “Erdogan Says
UAE’s Slanders About Turks, Ottomans Stem from Its Own Dirty
Business,” Daily Sabah, December 20, 2017; “New Street Signs
Honoring Ottoman Commander Hung Near UAE Embassy in
Turkey,” Daily Sabah, January 9, 2018, https://www.dailysabah.com
/diplomacy/2018/01/09/new-street-signs-honoring-ottoman
-commander-hung-near-uae-embassy-in-turkey;
“Turkish
Soap
Operas Latest Casualty of Mideast Conflict,” New York Daily
News, March 5, 2018; and “1st King of Saudi Arabia Accused of
Receiving Bribes from Britain after Release of Confidential Documents,” Daily Sabah, April 19, 2018, 3.
50. Omer Taspinar, Turkey and the Arab Gulf States: A Dance
of Uncertain Expectations (Washington, DC: Arab Gulf States
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shifting priorities and approaches, with each player
pursuing diverse interests, weakened the original unified resolve to address the Syrian Civil War directly
and gave Assad the political and military wherewithal
to withstand pressures to remove him from office.
The United States is currently contemplating pulling out its small contingent of military-related personnel from northwest Syria and replacing it with Saudi
forces or a combined Arab force, the deployment of
which would undoubtedly have unintended consequences. The latter would face a dilemma as it sought
to bridge the gap between US and Turkish operational
objectives resulting from the continued presence of
the US-backed Kurdish Syrian Defense Forces west
of the Euphrates River or along the border with Syria.
The Kurdish Syrian Defense Forces militia, along with
its affiliated Syrian, PKK-US, and Western-terroristdesignated supporters who helped achieve victory
against ISIS and the destruction of most of its caliphate
in Syria, would almost certainly be sidelined by the presence of any Arab peacekeeping force. Such a force may
also advance Syrian Sunni fortunes at the expense of
the Kurds and perhaps the Syrian-Iranian-HezbollahRussian military alliance. Such a scenario would play
into Turkey’s original plan of eliminating any Kurdish
armed deployment or presence along its borders with
Syria west of the Euphrates River.
Institute, 2015), 5. Turkey wants to keep all of its options open
because it relies heavily on all gulf states’ foreign direct investments (including Iran’s) and other economic and financial perks.
It does not want to get into a crossfire between rival Muslim Sunni
and Shia forces in the Greater Middle East. Mohammed Ayoub,
“Behind the Democratic Wave in the Arab World: The Middle
East’s Turko-Persian Future,” Insight Turkey 13, no. 2 (February
2, 2011): 57–70.
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Any proposed, multinational peacekeeping or
peacemaking force made up of Saudi and Egyptian
soldiers, plus perhaps Bahraini, Emirati, Qatari, and
Kuwaiti military personnel, would also most certainly
falter, given the competing priorities and current tensions stemming from the June 5, 2017, move by Saudi
Arabia, UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain to cut diplomatic
and transport ties with Qatar, which is a close ally of
Turkey, after accusing it of supporting terrorism. A
Qatari military contribution to any Arab-Syrian stabilization force would most likely side with Turkey
against the Kurdish Syrian Defense Forces and associated PKK militia. This would also result in each of
the members then pursuing their own operational
and strategic priorities and forming independent fiefdom-like enclaves in Syria’s northeastern region.
An Arab force under these circumstances would
face other more serious complications because of the
overlapping nature of peacekeeping juxtaposed with
peace-enforcing operations as outlined by the UN
Charter. In the latter case, given the current animosities among Saudi Arabia-UAE-Egypt with Iran and
Hezbollah in Syria and elsewhere, such operations
would almost surely bring the two camps into open
warfare by accident or design. The experience of such
a combined force with the dual missions in other
former troubled areas in the Greater Middle East, particularly Lebanon between 1975 and 1980, has been
one of little or no chance of success.51
51. Julian Borger, “Syria: Proposal to Replace US Troops with
Arab Force Comes with Grave Risks,” Guardian, April 18, 2018;
Michael Gordon, “US Seeks Arab Force and Funding for Syria,”
Wall Street Journal, April 16, 2018; and Zachary Cohen, “Bolton
Dealing to Build an Arab Military Force in Syria,” CNN, April
18, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/18/politics/trump-us-syria
-strategy-arab-force-pompeo-bolton/index.html. Then US Defense
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For its part, Turkey may also take full advantage
of these divisions and competing priorities within any
proposed Arab force to quickly reinforce the security
belt along its border with Syria, especially in the coveted areas of Manbij and Kobani, which is because of
Turkey’s obsession with opposing any autonomous
Syrian or Iraqi-Kurdish entity or state next to its borders. Turkey intends to use any territory occupied by
its military in Syria as a bargaining chip to demand
political concessions and guarantees from both allies
and foes, gaining tactical and strategic advantage as
far as Syria’s future is concerned. In any scenario, Syria
will almost certainly remain unstable for a long time
to come with or without the presence of US troops.
THE AMERICAN SYRIAN EXIT STRATEGY
DILEMMA
The debate about the US military deployment and
long-term US intentions in Syria goes on in Washington, with President Trump contemplating an end to
US military involvement, perhaps because of the lack
of important US strategic interests. Congress, however, is increasingly concerned about the lack of a
clear US strategy for a post-ISIS Syria once the primary
objective of defeating ISIS has been fully met. Several
Secretary James Mattis expressed reservations about the proposed Arab states’ involvement in the new proposed security
force in Syria, perhaps to placate Turkey, but probably to avoid
the clashing interests of such an endeavor. Paul Sonne and Missy
Ryan, “Mattis Warns Against Leaving Syria to Arab Allies with
No Direct US Role,” Washington Post, April 27, 2018, A-18. It is
worth noting that the current press reporting on the ongoing discussions between the United States and Egypt on the possibility
of the latter leading an Arab force to Syria is currently being done
through intelligence, rather than diplomatic or political-military,
channels.
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members of Congress have voiced concern over the
long-term presence of Iran and its Lebanese benefactor Hezbollah in Syria, which would threaten the security of America’s allies, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon.52
American military field commanders in Syria and
US Central Command (USCENTCOM) have advised
President Trump on the need to stay in Syria for the
long haul to stabilize the areas under their control
or under the control of allied Syrian Kurdish forces
to rebuild destroyed infrastructure and strengthen
Kurdish political and social institutions.53 Such advice
may have been driven by or based on US Army Field
Manual 3-0, a service document that guides military operations and doctrine and their possible aftermath.54 The differences in the strategic and operational
approaches between US Joint Commands and the US
52. Karen DeYoung, “President, Congress at Odds on Syria,”
Washington Post, April 19, 2018, A-1.
53. Ranking officers at the DoS; Ranking officers at the DoD;
Missy Ryan and Paul Sonne, “Even As Trump Urges Syria Exit,
Troops See Unfinished Job,” Washington Post, April 7, 2018, A-1;
Greg Jaffe, “For Trump and His Generals, ‘Victory’ Has Different Meanings,” Washington Post, April 5, 2018, https://www
.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/for-trump-and-his
-generals-victory-has-different-meanings/2018/04/05/8d74
eab0-381d-11e8-9c0a-85d477d9a226_story.html; and Liz Sly,
“US Troops in Syria May Be at Risk of ‘Mission Creep’ After a
Deadly Battle in the Syrian Desert,” Washington Post, February
9, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/syria
-accuses-us-of-aggression-after-its-warplanes-strike-pro-government
-forces/2018/02/08/bab1502a-0cb4-11e8-8890-372e2047c935_story
.html; The DoD may have accepted the inevitable downsizing of
its military presence in Iraq. Tamer al-Ghobashy and Paul Sonne,
“Pentagon Ends Combat Against ISIS in Iraq, But Will Retain
Troop Presence,” Washington Post, May 1, 2018, A-9.
54. Michael Lundy, GEN (USA), and Rich Creed, COL (USA),
“The Return of US Army Field Manual 3-0,” Military Review 97,
no. 6 (November-December 2017): 14.
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Army are important. Although Field Manual 3-0 is a
US Army service document—and although USCENTCOM, as a joint command, is not obligated to follow
it—recent statements from USCENTCOM appear
to have echoed a similar doctrinal exit approach to
Iraq and Syria. In a panel discussion at the United
States Institute of Peace on April 3, 2018, the head of
USCENTCOM, General Joseph L. Votel, stated Syria
is more complicated than Iraq and hard work remains,
such as stabilizing areas, consolidating gains, getting
people back into their homes, and addressing the
long-term issues of reconstruction.55
The main challenge for any US military withdrawal
from Syria will be translating war gains into political
outcomes, given that Syria does not pose a threat to
America’s vital interests. The flip side of this coin is, of
course, mission creep. At the heart of the matter is the
tension between President Trump’s understanding of
what constitutes victory on the battlefield in unconventional or asymmetrical combat zones and what his
military advisors and field commanders in Syria may
want to achieve in the long run in Syria. For its part,
Turkey will most likely try to fill the vacuum created
by an American exit from Syria and create a de facto
safe haven there, if only to repatriate as many Syrian
55. David Staten, SGT (USA), “CENTCOM Commander
Discusses Stabilization Posture in Iraq, Syria,” Department of
Defense News, April 3, 2018, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom
/News/Article/Article/1483798/centcom-commander-discusses
-stabilization-posture-in-iraq-syria/; Karen De Young and Missy
Ryan, “As Trump Talks of Leaving Syria, His Top Commander in
the Middle East Emphasizes the Need to Stay,” Washington Post,
April 4, 2018, A-1; Karen De Young and Shane Harris, “Trump
Orders Swift Syria Withdrawal,” Washington Post, April 5, 2018,
A-1; and Liz Sly, “Kurds Pulling Back from ISIS Fight,” Washington Post, March 7, 2018.
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refugees from the estimated 3.l million currently
residing in Turkey as possible, and at the same time,
secure its border towns and villages from potential
PKK attacks. Turkey may also use any territorial gains
at the expense of Syrian Kurdish forces to repopulate
the liberated areas with its Syrian Muslim Sunni supporters as a bargaining chip in a final Syrian political
settlement.56
The United States faces the same problem that has
always plagued militaries as they grapple with the
most appropriate time to withdraw prematurely from
theaters of combat. The tyranny of time has haunted
US military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq before,
but the issue touches on a more fundamental question
about war termination challenges involving nonstate
actors in Syria. Most wars involving terrorist organizations may never end because terror groups evolve
depending on contexts and changing regional and
international political dynamics. Although terrorist
groups can be defeated, the current nature and character of ethnic, national, and religious rivalries in the
Greater Middle East will make terrorism an instrument of states and nonstate actors, at least in the near
future.57
Terrorist adversaries will often come to the fight
long after the United States thought it had won and
56. Liz Sly and Zakaria Zakaria, “With ISIS Striking Back in Syria, a US Withdrawal Would Be a ‘Disaster,’
Kurds Warn,” Washington Post, April 5, 2018, https://www
.washingtonpost.com/world/syrian-kurds-warn-of-a-disaster-if-us
-troops-leave/2018/04/05/0b5619e0-386e-11e8-af3c-2123715f78df_
story.html.
57. Sune Engel Rasmussen, “As Islamic State Fades in Syria,
a New Militant Group Takes Root,” Wall Street Journal, April 19,
2018,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-islamic-state-fades-in-syria
-another-militant-group-takes-root-1524064045.
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its troops had departed a given theater. This may be
related to the inability of the US military to bridge
the gap between its use of overwhelming force and
the difficulties involved in defeating ragtag, illegal
combatants bent on dying for their causes. Given that
civilians in the United States have supremacy over US
military institutions in terms of expectations, the US
strategic outcome in Syria may not be as clear-cut.58
Given ISIS’s degraded combat posture and the increasingly diminished combat capabilities of its remaining enclaves in Syria, the limited maneuver warfare
employed effectively by the US Marine Corps and the
US Army against Japanese forces during World War II
in the Solomon Islands could offer a viable exit strategy for Syria.
Given ISIS’s degraded and declining military and
large-scale war-making capabilities and political and
financial fortunes, especially in Syria and Iraq, US
Marine Corps and US Army lessons learned from
maneuver warfare since World War II preclude continuing the fight on ISIS’s terms by using conventional
overwhelming force. Hence, it is more beneficial to
use maneuver operations and tactics to contain and
deprive ISIS of its momentum in waging violence in
these states since ISIS as an insurgency is now more
incapable of holding wide swaths. Most ISIS fighters
are either incarcerated or corralled in isolated, unpopulated areas; hence, ISIS has been reduced to attacking
soft targets rather than carrying out wide-scale warfare as it once did in Iraq and Syria.
58. Philip A. Crowl, “The Strategist’s Short Catechism: Six
Questions without Answers,” in The Harmon Memorial Lectures
in Military History (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History,
1988), 377–88.
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In short, maneuver warfare doctrine could serve
as a prelude to a US exit strategy, given the operational and strategic insignificance of the remaining
ISIS enclaves.59 Put another way, the military historian
and theorist of war, Carl von Clausewitz, could provide insight into the exit strategy debate in the United
States. To win, Clausewitz says the cost of war must
remain proportionate to the objective sought, constantly balancing ways, means, and ends.60
In the absence of a US war termination strategy in
Syria, any alternative, desired end state in Syria will
become elusive. The American public’s threshold
for prolonged warfare remains low and difficult to
gauge ahead of time. The objectives and desired end
state also change often in the course of war because of
domestic, regional, and international actors, as well as
other intervening factors, which preclude the achievement of total domination of the battlespace, as is the
case in Syria today.
Alternatively, if the objectives are attained, there
may be pressure to attain additional objectives beyond
those originally set, especially if the United States is
seen to be engaged in a limited war and its adversaries
and allies in the theater view their operations in terms
of total war. Unlike the United States, a superpower
that sees a fight against a terror group, regional players and American allies in the Middle East and North
59. Gerhard L Weinberg, A World At Arms (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 341–48; and Richard Tregaskis, Guadalcanal Diary (New York: Penguin Books, 1943). A good
discussion of operational maneuver can be found in Marine Corps
Combat Development Command, Campaigning, Marine Corps
Doctrinal Publication 1-2 (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat
Development Command, August 1997), 78–84.
60. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and
Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 92.
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Africa view the fight as involving the survival of their
regimes. An examination of the treatment of political
Islamists such as the MB by Egypt, the UAE, Yemen,
and North African countries indicates they view the
conflict as total war. Thus, Islamic regimes view ISIS
as an existential threat just as much as, or perhaps
even more than, the West does.
A better state of peace, as opposed to a definite
end state, is the more likely outcome in a limited war
scenario. By contrast, the Syrian Civil War is likely
to result in a clearer end state—the defeat of Assad’s
opposition forces. War termination and victory
become more elusive under these circumstances.
There is perhaps a current mismatch between what
the national command authority wants out of the US
involvement in Syria and what the evolving US military strategy is for Syria. Military operations and
tactics become irrelevant without a viable national
strategy that links ways, means, ends, risks, and consequences to one another.61
TURKEY-US RELATIONS POINT COUNTER
POINT: THE TURKISH PERSPECTIVE
There are several contentious issues separating Turkey from the United States. Foremost among
them is US support for the Kurd-dominated Syrian
Democratic Forces, which was established with the
help of the United States in 2015 to fight and defeat
ISIS. Following the fall of ISIS’s purported capital of
Raqqa in Syria in October 2017, US military field commanders proceeded to float the idea of converting the
Syrian Democratic Forces from an effective offensive
61. Terry L. Deibel, Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American
Statecraft (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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organization to a defensive border protection and
patrol entity to be deployed along the Syrian-Turkish
border to protect against any new ISIS resurgence or infiltration into Syrian Democratic Forcesliberated Syrian enclaves. Later, however, under
constant protestations from Ankara, the Defense
Department announced the new force’s mission (stabilization), its intended size (small), and its intended
composition (Arab militia, not Kurdish).62
From the beginning, Turkey, suspicious of America’s strategic plans for Syria, raised the issue of the
ambiguity surrounding US intentions during several
high-ranking diplomatic discussions with US diplomats, including former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and President Trump. Turkey also had serious
reservations about the US Army training and equipping the Syrian PYD; its militia, the YPG; and most
importantly, the PKK, which Turkey and the United
States have both designated as a terrorist organization. As far as Turkey is concerned, the Kurdish Syrian
Defense Forces’ association with the PYD, YPG, and
PKK is ultimately designed to challenge Turkey’s sovereignty and carry out cross-border terrorist attacks
deep into the Turkish heartland. In short, Turkey feels
the United States is pitting its short-term interests
against its principles in Syria by joining forces with
known terrorist groups by proxy and by abandoning
long-term, strategic partnerships with Ankara in the
fight against terrorism.63
The other existential threat Turkey says it faces
revolves around what it perceives as the persistent
62. Ranking officers at the DoD.
63. Turkish Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social
Research, interview with the author, March 27, 2018. The foundation’s views reflect current Turkish government views.
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influence of the moderate Muslim cleric, Fetullah
Gulen. There is no doubt that the ruling AKP and
Erdogan see Gulen as an existential threat. President
Erdogan has offered to exchange Brunson, two Turkish nationals, and a dozen or so US citizens currently
in custody in Turkey for Gulen and two other Turkish operatives convicted in New York City of violating
US- and UN-imposed sanctions on Iran.64 There are
other disagreements that Turkey has with the United
64. Benjamin Weiser and Carlotta Gall, “At Iran Sanction
Trial: A Star Witness Revealed, and a Sleepy Juror,” New York
Times, December 2, 2017; “FETO-Linked Judge Berman ‘Won’t
Allow’ Prison Call that Could Indict Zarrab to Be Played For
Jury,” Sabah Daily, December 19, 2017, https://www.dailysabah.com
/americas/2017/12/19/feto-linked-judge-berman-wont-allow-prison
-call-that-could-indict-zarrab-to-be-played-for-jury; and Mehul Srivastava, “US-Turkey Relations Take Another Turn for Worse,”
Financial Times, October 9, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content
/39cdc78c-ad04-11e7-aab9-abaa44b1e130. The two Turkey operatives, Iranian-born Reza Zarrab—a gold merchant residing in
Turkey but of Iranian origin—and his coconspirator, Turkish
banker Mehmet Hakan Atilla, were convicted along with seven
other coconspirators of violating US sanctions worth over a billion
dollars for exchanging Turkish gold (an unsanctioned item if sold
to private Iranian entities vice Iranian government agencies) in
exchange for Iranian oil. Zarrab is reportedly cooperating with US
prosecutors in exchange for his freedom. He was captured while
vacationing with his family in Florida. US prosecutors traced the
gold to Iranian shadow government agencies. The convictions
of Zarrab and Atilla shed light on corruption charges against
President Erdogan and his family, which he denies, saying only
that the gold-for-oil transaction was a private one and a routine
trade activity not covered by the US sanction regime, and that the
American judge presiding over the Zarrab-Atilla cases is biased
against Turkey because of his ties to Gulen, who is out to smear
President Erdogan’s reputation. More important, however, is the
negative impact on US-Turkey relations of any possible US sanctions against Turkey, given the ongoing tensions between them
on several other issues.
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States, including the latter’s unconditional support for
Israel against the Palestinians, the decision by Trump
to move the US Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to
Jerusalem, and the subsequent UN General Assembly
vote against the US position, at which time the United
States threatened to cut off financial aid to countries
who voted against the US decision.65
Turkey believes that although the current partnership with the United States and NATO is in trouble,
there is no viable alternative to its NATO membership and commitment, despite all of the rhetoric to the
contrary. Turkey believes that America’s shifting tactics, from changing the Assad regime to fighting and
defeating ISIS specifically and terrorism in general, are
a symptom of the contradictions inherent in US foreign policymaking.
Unlike the United States, Turkey views the ISIS
threat as secondary to the bigger, regional problems
it faces. ISIS did not and does not impact the region
directly, Turkish officials argue. The US-KurdishSyrian Defense Forces alliance and its offshoot,
including foreign fighters, are more directly Turkey’s regional problem. ISIS to Turkey is an American
obsession devoid of any long-term, strategic vision,
and as a result, the United States is not draining the
terror swamp in Syria, but rather focusing on the
symptoms and not the root of the terror threats and
65. “President Erdogan Slams US for Threatening to Cut
Off Aid to Countries over Jerusalem Vote,” Hurriyet Daily News,
December 31, 2017, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/president
-erdogan-slams-us-for-threatening-to-cut-off-aid-to-countries-over
-jerusalem-vote-125037. Earlier, President Erdogan thanks Russian
President Putin for supporting the UN General Assembly Resolution against the United States. “Erdogan Thanks Putin on Jerusalem Resolution Support in Phone Call,” Hurriyet Daily News,
December 22, 2017.
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vulnerabilities emanating from ISIS—namely, ISIS’s
broad public and messaging appeal. Turkey also
believes that any US-Syrian stabilization projects in
Syrian-liberated areas are artificial fixes with no longterm success guarantees because they lack a link to
broader strategic objectives. Given the original program under the Obama administration of arming and
funding “vetted Syrian opposition groups,” Turkey
questions why and how the PKK—a US-designated
terrorist organization—became “vetted.”66
Turkey argues including the PKK in the Kurdish
Syrian Defense Forces was a big American blunder
because the PKK took advantage of US and NATO
terror vulnerabilities in Syria by temporarily switching tactics to fighting ISIS in return for cash, weapons, and training—fighting which Turkey fears will
eventually be redirected against its towns and cities.
Turkey believes the PKK has its own strategic agenda
in Syria that runs contrary to US-Turkish efforts in
the fight against regional and international terrorism
within their longstanding counterterrorism cooperation and coordination strategies.
According to Turkey, America’s ambiguous position after combat ended in Raqqa can only mean that
the United States wants a permanent Kurdish enclave
there. Iran, Syria, Russia, and Turkey have strongly
opposed any such move. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu, went as far as demanding
the resignation of the “pro-Kurd” US special envoy
to the coalition against violent Islamic extremism and
ISIS for allegedly backing Syrian Kurdish fighters and
66. “Disrespect for Red Lines: Why Turkey is a US Ally but
Not a Partner,” Sputnik News, September 11, 2017; and Helen
Cooper, “Obama Requests Money to Train ‘Appropriately Vetted’
Syrian Rebels,” New York Times, June 26, 2014.
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their nationalist aspirations. Last January, Cavusoglu
was quoted as saying the United States was guilty of
siding with the wrong partner in Syria in reference to
the Kurdish Syrian Defense Forces and the associated
Kurdish militia; however, President Erdogan in earlier
statements praised the United States and said Turkey
was always ready to cooperate with the United States
over Syrian issues.67 Meetings between former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Cavusoglu and current Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Cavusoglu
have yielded only minor results, although diplomatic
channels continue to remain open between Ankara
and Washington.68 According to press reports, on July
26, 2018, Christian Evangelist Andrew Brunson was
moved to house detention from his jail cell in Istanbul
following the personal intercession of Pompeo.
TURKEY-US RELATIONS POINT COUNTER
POINT: THE US PERSPECTIVE
The American position on current US-Turkish
relations differs dramatically from the mostly unified
Turkish position given the diverse nature and character of America’s liberal constitutional democracy and
general political culture. For example, there are currently differing institutional views regarding Turkey
67. “Turkey Says Pro-Kurd US Envoy Brett McGurk Should
Leave,” BBC News, May 18, 2017, www.bbc.com/news/world
-europe-39960381; “US Picked the Wrong Partner, Ankara Criticizes Washington in New York Times Article,” Hurriyet Daily News,
January 29, 2018, 1; “Turkey Wants to Cooperate with US in Syria,
Erdogan Says,” Daily Sabah, December 31, 2017, 1; and Turkish
diplomats, interview with the author, February 20, 2018.
68. Semih Idiz, “Pompeo’s Meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Fails to Calm Tensions,” Al-Monitor, May 1,
2018, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/fa/originals/2018/05/turkey
-united-states-cavusoglu-pompeo-meeting.html.
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and its regional and international policies. A majority
of members of Congress view Turkey as non-Western,
Islamic, authoritarian, and unfriendly to minorities,
citing the violent confrontation between Erdogan’s
bodyguards and Kurdish protesters and their American supporters outside the Turkish Embassy in Washington, DC, on May 17, 2017. Congress is also upset
over the detention of two Turkish nationals working
on consular issues in Istanbul and Adana, Turkey,
as well as the detention of Andrew Brunson, and
has demanded their unconditional release. Gulen’s
Hizmet organization in the United States has been
highly successfully in lobbying Congress against
Erdogan since at least 2015. Moreover, some members
of Congress have expressed objections to Turkey’s
warming relations with Russia and Iran as well as the
proposed acquisition by Turkey of the Russian S-400
air defense system. Congress passed a law in August
2017 forbidding any associated company or state from
conducting business with Russian defense entities,
which ultimately will adversely impact Turkey as
well. Members of Congress have also been unhappy
with Turkey’s increasingly anti-Israeli and pro-Hamas
positions. Some members have threatened to withhold
aid and levy special sanctions on Turkey in an effort to
get it to change its policies. A noted scholar on Turkey,
Steven Cook, went as far as labeling the US-Turkish
alliance a myth.69
69. Amberin Zaman, “US Sanctions Loom over Defiant
Turkey,” Al-Monitor, April 20, 2018; Gregg Roman, “Navigating the US Collision with Turkey,” The Hill, March 5, 2018;
Barcin Yinanc, “Turkey Could Face Sanctions for S-400 Purchase,” Hurriyet Daily News, February 1, 2018, http://www
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While USCENTCOM and US European Command
are in sync as far as broad US military strategy is concerned in the fight against ISIS and other terror groups,
both oppose the Turkish purchase of the Russian S-400
system. Both agree to US objectives to minimize the
influence of Russia and Iran in the region and both
support any US policy in Syria as long as it emanates
from the American presidency. They do, however,
have different perspectives on Turkey and its current
leadership, with US European Command tending to
be more open-minded on Turkey’s operational and
strategic concerns about its neighbors and USCENTCOM less so, according to US officials interviewed
by the author. This probably goes back to 2003, when
USCENTCOM-led troops were barred by the AKP-led
Turkish Parliament from transiting Turkish territory
to attack the Saddam Hussein regime in neighboring Iraq. Moreover, USCENTCOM sees Turkey as an
obstacle to its end state in Syria—namely, supporting
and developing the Syrian Kurdish liberated areas
under its direct control.70
Former Secretary of Defense General James Mattis
went out of his way to serve as an honest broker by
moderating disagreements between his commanders
and Turkey. He has assured Turkey that the Kurdish Syrian Defense Forces will now predominantly be
made up of Arab, vice Kurdish, fighters, and there was
a difference between the YPG and PKK fighters as far
as the United States is concerned. Despite these differences, the Defense Department has forged ahead, providing an alternatively acceptable air defense system
Foreign Policy, October 12, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/12
/the-american-alliance-with-turkey-was-built-on-a-myth/.
70. Ranking officers at the DoS; and ranking officers at the
DoD.
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to Turkey that would meet its minimum defense
needs and sway it away from further Russian weapon
purchases if only to ensure that congressional sanctions against Turkey are put on hold. A consensus is
emerging in the US policy community that Turkey has
yet to master the art of American checks and balances.
All of this has developed while the Departments of
Defense and State have been working hard to keep
Turkey within the Western orbit and away from the
Russians.71
American officials commented in late spring 2018
that current relations between the United States and
Turkey are complicated and often swing between
cooperation and enmity. The officials acknowledged
that US support for the Kurdish Syrian Defense Forces
has caused bumps in the strategic relationship between
the two countries, but this damage is reparable if ways
can be found to bridge the declining trust and enhance
communication between the two sides. The same officials stated Turkey has some legitimate grievances and
the United States was working hard to address them.
They opined that although the Syrian YPG militia’s
close ties to the US-designated PKK terror group are
known, the YPG was and still is a “battle necessity”
for the United States. The officials emphasized when
the United States tried repeatedly to enlist Turkey
and its vetted Syrian Sunni Arab fighters in the fight
against ISIS, the response from Turkey was mute. The
United States had no other choice but to go with the
Syrian Kurds.
As the stakes in Syria became high, the US justification for choosing the Syrian Kurdish side hinged on:
(1) Turkey’s lackluster response to the US position on
71. Ranking officers at the DoS; and ranking officers at the
DoD.
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setting up a counter-ISIS force; (2) the inability of the
United States to enlist the military support of an indigenous Syrian Sunni force that was trustworthy and
committed to America’s strategic objectives of focusing on fighting and defeating ISIS; and (3) the American goal of defeating ISIS first and foremost. Thus, for
the United States, forming a predominantly Kurdish
Syrian Defense Forces was picking the best of many
bad options, especially given that American public
opinion was opposed to new military ventures in the
Middle East. In the opinion of US officials interviewed
by the author, America needed to recruit Syrian-based
fighters to engage and defeat ISIS. The Kurds appeared
to fit that bill because they were reliable, capable, and
willing to implement the US operational plan against
ISIS, according to the same DoS official. Members of
the Kurdish Syrian Defense Forces had sacrificed and
died in Syria for the United States, and now the latter
was obligated to return the favor in kind, promising arms, training, infrastructure rebuilding following combat, and the establishment of local governing
councils in liberated areas.
At the same time, US officials have made it clear
to Turkey that the United States will not engage in
hostage diplomacy over the detainees in exchange
for Gulen and other demands, in accordance with
the long-standing US policy of not making deals with
and giving no concessions to hostage takers. As for
the Turkish employees of the US consulates in Istanbul and Adana, they were performing routine contacts with Turkish society, which was part of their job
description.
Hundreds of thousands of Turkish citizens have
also been caught up in this campaign of detention and
harassment since the failed coup under the seventh
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state-of-emergency decree. State Department officials
acknowledged to the author that the United States has
lost the messaging battle with the majority of Turkey’s
youth as more and more of them are today buying into
President Erdogan’s populist, anti-NATO and anti-US,
nationalist rhetoric. Erdogan engages in this rhetoric
to please his most ardent and loyal AKP constituency;
nevertheless, he keeps the door open for dialogue
with the United States and other NATO allies. Some
scholars on Turkey attribute Erdogan’s domestic populist strategy and authoritarian tendencies to his success at the ballot box and to his unique political skill
of keeping his domestic rivals off-balance—a winning
electoral strategy. Others have alluded to the need
for a corrective strategy to bring Turkey to a more
liberal constitutional system, complete with accountability and oversight.72 These officials also believe that
although Erdogan’s detractors see him increasingly
becoming a dictator, he sees himself as a reformer
reflecting the longstanding public quest for domestic
change and power, especially regarding the military
that ruled Turkey indirectly from 1923 to 2002. Given
Turkey’s historic loss of territory following World
War I, state survival remains paramount today, but,
at the same time, Turkey is willing and able to serve
as America’s eyes and ears against terrorist threats
and vulnerabilities. In other words, Turkey remains
a significant US strategic partner in the fight against
terrorism, especially given its geostrategic location in
one of the most unstable corners of the world. Russia,
on the other hand, is taking advantage of Turkey’s differences with the United States and NATO to advance
72. Henri J. Barkey and Omer Tspinar, “Republic of Turkey,”
in The Government and Politics of the Middle East, ed. Mark Gasiorowski and Sean L. Yom (Boulder, CO: The Westview Press,
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its interests in the Greater Middle East at the latter’s
expense. In short, Russia is playing an opportunistic
game with Turkey’s help—something that is acceptable to neither NATO nor the United States given Russia’s overall stated goal of weakening and ultimately
destroying the alliance politically.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
While the current standoff between Turkey and
the United States appears to be moving from bad to
worse, it has yet to reach a breaking point or a point
of no return. Although tensions and policy differences
continue to plague US-Turkish relations, efforts by
well-meaning policymakers within the US government and Turkey’s civilian and military establishment point to perhaps better days to come, given the
resilience and endurance of the ties that bind the two
nations together. The US perspective on Turkey could
be traced to many factors, starting with the refusal
of the Turkish Parliament to allow US forces to transit Turkish territory to attack Iraq in 2003 and the
slow Turkish support for the US-led coalition against
ISIS. Turkey is also being put on notice by the United
States for feuding against other NATO allies—namely,
2017), 203–32; Henri J. Barkey, “Erdogan’s Foreign Policy is
in Ruins,” Foreign Policy, February 4, 2016, https://foreignpolicy
.com/2016/02/04/erdogans-foreign-policy-is-in-ruins/;
Henri
J.
Barkey, “Turkey’s Moment of Inflection,” Survival 52, no. 3 (JuneJuly 2010): 39–50; Steven A. Cook, False Dawn: Protest, Democracy
and Violence in the New Middle East (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2017); and Soner Cagatpay, The New Sultan, Erdogan and the
Crisis of Modern Turkey (London, UK: I. B. Tauris, 2017). Both Cook
and Cagatpay have raised the issue of Turkey becoming an illiberal, authoritarian democracy under Erdogan’s AKP-led regime
and political party; Henri J. Barkey and Eric Edelman, “Turkey’s
Forgotten Detainees,” Washington Post, July 30, 2018, A-17.
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Germany, the Netherlands, Cyprus, France, and
Greece. In the last case, tensions have been brewing
in recent months over new border disputes in the
Aegean and the refusal of Greece to extradite a group
of Turkish officers allegedly involved in the failed
coup. Although resolving the Cyprus issue remains
high on the US agenda, tensions between Turkey and
Cyprus over oil and gas exploration rights and access
off the coast of Cyprus are forcing the United States
and the European Union to side with Cyprus and even
entertain sending US naval ships to protect Cypriot
gas and oil tracks at sea.
Despite these and other policy differences over
Syria and other domestic problems facing Turkey,
both sides seem reluctant to cause irreparable damage
to their alliance. The United States, which has traditional ties with Turkey, does not want a military
confrontation with the country over Syria. The most
hopeful sign of addressing some of the protracted
problems currently facing US-Turkish relations stems
from the fact that Turkey is still seen by the United
States as important to America’s national security
interests, especially given Turkey’s geostrategic location and cultural familiarity with its volatile neighbors.
Turkey is currently self-absorbed with its ambitions
and Muslim neo-Ottoman nationalist revivalism, but
its unique ballot-box democracy, albeit imperfect by
Western standards, will work toward increasing harmonization toward the United States and its NATO
allies in the long run. This can only happen through a
sustained strategic dialogue.
The idea is to keep Turkey and the United States
engaged while trying to find solutions to the issues that
separate them, because once the current tactical posturing is stripped away, the strategic alliance becomes
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more visible. There is indeed current evidence for
better US-NATO-Turkish cross-cultural communication techniques to manage and resolve outstanding
policy and strategic differences. In short, Turkey is not
yet lost, but there are challenges facing America and
its NATO partners in how to bridge the growing gap
between them and Turkey. This challenge touches on a
fundamental question: What kind of strategic relationship do the United States, NATO, and Turkey want or
desire? Clearly, they are at a policy and strategic crossroad. The answer lies in the need for the United States
to craft a new strategy toward Turkey and vice versa
that takes into account the new realities of Turkish,
NATO, and American domestic political dynamics,
their changing nature and character, as well as Turkey’s quest for regional influence and ambitions and
its goal of becoming a great regional power. Turkey,
NATO, and the United States share Western values,
and these values, although not equal for all partners,
are keys to better multicultural harmony if applied
properly across the board.
Turkey, NATO, and the United States must come
to realize the context that brought them together is
changing and their interests and policy directions
must be reset. This is driven by the changing nature
of world politics and the liberal structure of the international system, given the rise of China’s economic
diplomacy and Russia’s political and economic interventionism abroad. While US and NATO involvement
in the Syrian Civil War was a game changer, so was
Turkey’s involvement, given the unintended consequences, including the presence of over 3.1 million
Syrians in Turkey—a high price to pay. Domestically,
the refugee issue necessitated the strategic shift in Turkey’s domestic, regional, and international postures
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after the third AKP win in the November 2015 snap
elections.
Turkey, NATO, and the United States have worked
and fought together since the Korean War in 1950.
That war was an important milestone for Turkey in
particular, much like perhaps the Gallipoli Campaign,
albeit not at the same level. The Turkish brigade in
Korea lost 400 defending the US Army’s retreat after
the battle of Chongchon River. Such memories linger
on in the Turkish psyche with great nostalgia. The
Korean War for Turks is yesterday in historical terms.
A few years ago, American scholars and analysts outlined policy differences between the United States and
Turkey and provided constructive paths toward reconciling the differences.73
The Brunson affair appears to be the key to moving
forward if it can be resolved diplomatically. For now,
each side is digging in from recent moves and countermoves, including economic sanctions and asset
freezes. Although the Gulen affair looms large over
all outstanding contentious issues, Turkey’s back is
to the economic wall; this leaves Erdogan with many
bad options and little room for maneuver, despite all
rhetoric to the contrary. Turkey’s economy, which
ranks 17th in the world, is today facing not only serious domestic challenges, but, should its economy
collapse altogether, the impact would most certainly
73. Graham E. Fuller, The New Turkish Republic (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2008), 151–62; Steven Cook et al.,
US-Turkey Relations: A New Partnership (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2012); Phillip H. Gordon and Omer
Taspinar, Winning Turkey: How America, Europe, and Turkey Can
Revive a Fading Partnership (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute
Press, 2008); and Hugh Pope, “Pax Ottoman?: The Mixed Source
of Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 6 (November-December 2010).
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reverberate throughout the international liberal monetary and trade order the United States has championed and worked so diligently to sustain since World
War II. There is no win-win outcome here.74
The removal of tariffs and sanctions against
Turkey by the United States can be initiated by a presidential executive order; this could be a short-term fix
and a face-saving mechanism for Turkey in the current standoff. But under the currently charged circumstances, this cannot happen without Turkey making
the first move to release Brunson. Short of that, Turkey
still holds a wild card—namely, the status of the strategic Incirlik Air Base, which it could play by ordering the shuttering of the base, a move which would
have disastrous strategic consequences for all parties
involved. The bottom line is that there is no easy exit
from the current messy standoff between Turkey on
one hand and the United States and NATO on the
other. The long-term implications for US-NATOTurkish relations are dire.
Therefore, given the more complicated but inherently symbiotic nature of the relations between the
United States and its NATO allies vis-à-vis Turkey,
the following policy recommendations are in order.

74. David Lynch and Kareem Fahim, “Turkey’s Currency
Crisis Triggers Global Worries,” Washington Post, August 14, 2018,
A-1; Carlotta Gall and Jack Ewing, “Tensions between Turkey
and US Soar as Trump Orders New Sanctions,” New York Times,
August 10, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/business
/turkey-erdogan-economy-lira.html; and Jack Ewing and Alexandra
Stevenson, “Plunge in Lira, Turkey’s Currency, Fuels of Financial
Contagion,” New York Times, August 13, 2018, 1.
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POLICY RECOMMENDATION FOR THE UNITED
STATES
• The United States should continue its strategic,
political-military dialogue with Turkey, regardless of the latter’s economic and military ties
with its neighbors. Turkey’s relations with Iran
and Russia, for example, are transactional and
tactical, yet its relations with the US and NATO
are strategic and enduring.
• The United States should develop a clearer
strategy for Syria, especially toward the Kurds.
The lack of a clear exit strategy, coupled with
the American public reluctance to support
expanded military operations in Syria, should
be a signal that the time has come to elevate
tactical and operational activities to a strategic
level.
• USCENTCOM and US Special Operations Command commanders and their staffs should sustain their direct, face-to-face communication
with their Turkish counterparts, not just institutional communication. There is no substitute for
effective, personalized command relationships.
Turks respond positively to such personal
approaches, even though they may not show it,
because culturally they avoid losing face. Questioning a Turkish decision on any issue is seen
as attacking the decision-maker. Command
relationships can help avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation on all political-military
levels.
• The Defense Department should reinvigorate its
long-term professional military education projects with Turkey. Specifically, the US National
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Defense University, which has credible and
long-standing experience in all fields of research
and defense studies, should offer assistance to
the newly established Turkish Defense University in the form of curriculum development,
leadership, and exchange programs between
resident specialists both civilian and military.
Mid-level professional military education institutions such as the US Army War College and
the Marine Corps University can also play a critical supporting role in this endeavor. This will
help familiarize Turkish officers with US procedures and capabilities and promote interoperability, which will facilitate future cooperation,
create goodwill, and lead to the development of
long-term personal relationships.
• A review of the ongoing exchange of International Military Education and Training-type
programs between the United States and Turkey
should take place to identify problem areas and
seek ways to increase the enrollment of officers on both sides, including in service branch
training schools. In short, service-to-service
connections need to be reinvigorated. Planners
and commanders in the US Army, for example,
should be continually sensitized to the interests
and objectives of Turkey, including with respect
to the Kurdish issue, and how this may affect
the operational environment in zones of continuing conflict in order to facilitate deconfliction and avoid confrontations.
• Given US-Turkish military-to-military relations
have been affected in recent years, primarily
by USCENTCOM because of the wars in Iraq
and Syria, US European Command should be

76

•

•

•

•
•

•

encouraged to take the lead in rebuilding this
relationship in the future.
The United States should strive to rebuild trust
with Turkey and its citizens—a country and
people who, given their history after Turkey’s
defeat in World War I, tend to believe in great
power dismemberment conspiracies directed
against them.
The F-35 training program in Texas for Turkish pilots should be expanded because it has
had a positive public diplomacy impact on the
Turkish press and public. A recent photo of a
Turkish pilot training in the cockpit of an F-35
jet in Texas was very well received in Turkey as
a good-will American gesture.
The United States should emphasize it will
ensure the Syrian Kurds will have a political
role in Syria once hostilities end, but any Kurdish national aspirations will be contained within
Syria. Failing this, the United States would have
to decide whether its strategic partnership with
Turkey is more important than its partnership
with nonstate partners.
The United States should emphasize it will not
support sectarian enclaves or territorial dismemberment in Syria.
The United States should assure Turkey that its
security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity
are an integral part of the US-NATO commitment to the country.
The United States should reinvigorate its Turkish youth outreach through educational and
cultural messaging to regain the momentum for
a secular, stable, and pro-West Turkey.
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• The United States should use existing, multilateral and bilateral, diplomatic formats, such as
the G20, for higher-level engagements. American policymakers should emphasize areas of
convergence and common interests—such as
terrorism, international crime, drug and human
trafficking, and migrant rescue—where the
Turkish and US military can cooperate.
• The United States should continue militaryto-military talks at the level of the Secretary of
Defense to, among other things, avoid accidental clashes in Syria.
• The United States should persist in sharing
the realities and shortcomings of Turkish policies that have a direct, adverse effect on the
United States and its NATO allies without
threatening Turkey with dire consequences.
Turkish officials respond better to learning
about issues through person-to-person, diplomatic exchanges, rather than institution-toinstitution exchanges through diplomatic
demarches. This will require efforts to better
understand the Turkish narrative through
increased linguistic training and other educational and cultural exchanges.
• The United States should exhibit patience, presence, and perseverance in Turkey. Turkey and
the United States cannot afford to lose each
other.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NATO
• NATO should continue to be inclusive of all of
its members and avoid encouraging the perception Turkey currently has of the organization,
which is some members are more equal than
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•
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others. Turks have long held the perception
that despite their sacrifice in joining NATO and
getting involved in the Korean War and in protecting Europe’s southern flank during most of
the Cold War period, Greece has been Western
Europe’s more favored strategic partner. This
is one of the main reasons Europe continues to
treat Turkey as second-class when compared to
Greece and the Greek Cypriots.
NATO should continue to make constructive
efforts to resolve internal and bilateral problems with Turkey, acting as an honest broker.
NATO should work to resolve lexicon definitions and reach final consensus with Turkey on
terms such as “terrorism,” “Islamic terrorism,”
and “Islam” to enhance counterterrorism and
counterintelligence cooperation and in-service
coordination at all levels.
NATO should embark on a messaging campaign that celebrates Turkey’s history and
culture and downplays the importance or relevance of NATO to neo-Ottoman Turkey, since
the latter has more to do with Turkey’s domestic politics than its foreign policy.
NATO should manage and resolve strategic, operational, and tactical differences with
Turkey, taking into more realistic assessment
the latter’s evolving military doctrine and
changing chain-of-command structure.

WHAT TURKEY MAY WANT TO CONSIDER
DOING
The following are policy initiatives that could have
positive effects on US-Turkish relations.
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• Turkey should cut down on the political rhetoric against the United States and Western European partners and release Brunson and other
US citizens from detention unconditionally.
• Turkey should continue the strategic dialogue
with the United States and NATO.
• President Erdogan should shed his authoritarian tendencies in favor of the rule of law and
fair and free elections, given his increasingly
authoritarian tendencies, as stated previously.
• Turkey should search hard for points of conversion with the United States and NATO to
re-rebuild trust through confidence-building
measures.
• Turkey should explore new ways to establish
a new dialogue with Israel on the Palestinian
question.
• Turkey should brandish and revive its moderate, multicultural, Muslim credentials as a
model.
• Turkey should address the issue of minorities
head on, as it did when President Erdogan communicated the message of sorrow for the victims of the 1915 Armenian Genocide.
• Turkey should end the state-of-emergency
decrees.
• Turkey should ensure that the protection of
human and civil rights in Turkey go hand-inhand with the fight against terrorism.
• Turkey should revisit its laws governing terrorist offenses and bring them in line with universally acceptable standards.
• Turkey should end its siege mentality and
insecurities driven by conspiracy theories and
unproven facts.
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• Turkey should fully support the UN peace
initiatives on Syria as the best alternatives for
achieving long-term Turkish regional security
and stability.
POSTSCRIPT
Several key developments that confirm rather
than invalidate the basic assessments in this study
have emerged since this manuscript was submitted
to the editors. Foremost among them is the arrival of
the first shipments of the S-400 antimissile platforms
from Russia in July 2019 despite strong US and NATO
objections.75 The US Congress in particular has threatened to levy sanctions against Turkey—a key NATO
ally—should Turkey deploy the system, which Congress sees as violating existing trade sanctions against
Russia. These latter sanctions extend to any foreign
entity or state that imports weapon-related technologies from Russia.76 The Trump administration, under
pressure from Congress, finally canceled the Turkishcoveted $428 billion F-35 aircraft sale to Turkey to
compel the latter to reverse its decision regarding the
S-400 purchase worth several billion dollars.77
75. Ryan Browne, Nick Paton Walsh, and Kara Fox, “Russia
Starts Delivery of S-400 Missile System to Turkey, Setting up Standoff with US,” CNN, July 12, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/12
/europe/turkey-russia-missiles-intl/index.html.
76. Karoun Demirjian, “The Law Says Trump Must Punish
Turkey. Congress May Force Him to Follow through,” Washington Post, August 6, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com
/national-security/law-says-trump-must-punish-turkey-congress
-may-force-him-to-follow-through/2019/08/06/92d77a38-b597-11e
9-8f6c-7828e68cb15f_story.html.
77. Richard Aboulafia, “Turkey after the F-35: Choice for
Alternative Fighter Will Help Shape Country’s Future,” Forbes,
July 21, 2019. Ironically, the Turkish press on August 2, 2019,
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For his part, President Erdogan has stated publicly
the S-400 purchase from Russia was a commercial, not
a strategic, transaction, stressing that the decision to
go ahead with the purchase was also based on Turkey’s sovereign right—thus rejecting US and NATO
claims that the purchase endangers NATO’s operational and military intelligence systems.78 He also
threatened that if the United States went along with
its decision to impose sanctions on Turkey, the latter
would retaliate.79 It is not clear how, but should such
events unfold, they could undoubtedly lead to irreparable damage and could push Turkey more into the
Sino-Russian orbit. Such developments would most
likely adversely impact US and NATO interests.
The other current irritant in US-Turkish relations
revolves around Turkey’s insistence on removing
pro-US Kurdish Syrian militias from all areas contiguous to its historic border with Syria. The goal is to
revive the idea of establishing a 20-mile safe zone for
Syrian refugees returning from Turkey that is free of
any PKK-YPG presence. President Erdogan first surfaced the idea of a free zone inside Syria in 2012. He
revived the idea on December 19, 2018, but has not
ran stories picked up from Israel’s Channel 12 television station
saying that Israel pressured members of Congress and the Trump
administration to cancel the F-35 program with Turkey. See
“Israel Secretly Lobbied Trump’s Government to Cancel F-35 Deal
with Turkey,” Daily Sabah, August 2, 2019, https://www.dailysabah.
com/defense/2019/08/02/israel-secretly-lobbied-trumps-government-to
-cancel-f-35-deal-with-turkey-reports.
78. “Turkey Expects US to Act as a True Ally: Erdogan,” Daily Sabah, August 6, 2019, https://www.dailysabah.com
/diplomacy/2019/08/06/turkey-expects-us-to-act-as-true-ally-erdogan.
79. “Turkey to Retaliate if US Imposes Sanctions over S-400
Purchase, FM Cavusoglu Says,” Daily Sabah, July 22, 2019, https://
www.dailysabah.com/defense/2019/07/22/turkey-expects-us-not-to
-impose-sanctions-over-s-400-fm-cavusoglu-says.
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received US consent to the plan. A free zone in Syria
would mean the end of any Kurdish Syrian militia
presence, including the US-backed Kurdish Syrian
Defense Forces west of the Euphrates River. President
Erdogan threatened to establish the free zone with or
without support from his NATO allies; this prompted
a visit to Ankara by Ambassador James Jeffrey on
July 22, 2019, to dissuade Turkey from any unilateral
move that would adversely affect US Special Forces or
their Syrian Kurdish proxies.80 Such a unilateral military incursion by Turkey against the Kurdish Syrian
Defense Forces has been rejected by the United States
on several occasions before. US Secretary of Defense
Mark Esper pointed out recently that any such moves
by Turkey to push the Kurdish Syrian Defense Forces
east of the Euphrates River by force would not be
acceptable.81 The most recent meeting between DoD
and Turkish military officials in Ankara indicates
the diplomatic talks may yet bear fruit, but differences between the two sides concerning the size of
the free zone and the status of Kurdish fighters west
of the Euphrates still have to be fully developed. The
United States is aiming to address Turkey’s concerns
about the YPG/PKK presence along its border without abandoning the latter, given their strong role in
defeating ISIS and containing associated forces such as
the Nusra Front militia made up of former al-Qaeda
80. Jean Yackley, “US Envoy Holds Talks in Ankara as Turkey
Threatens to Invade Syria,” Al-Monitor, July 22, 2019, https://www.
al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/07/us-envoy-talks-turkey-invade
-syria-threat.html#ixzz5vxPGeMhf.
81. Idrees Ali, “Any Turkish Incursion into Syria ‘Unacceptable,’ Will Prevent It: Pentagon Chief,” Reuters, August
6,
2019,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-turkey-syria
/any-turkish-incursion-into-syria-unacceptable-will-prevent-it
-pentagon-chief-idUSKCN1UW0TG.
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elements.82 There are, however, other complications
surrounding the establishment of any buffer zones in
Syria given Syrian President Assad’s insisting all uninvited foreign troops, including those from the United
States and Turkey, leave and turn territories under
their control over to Syria. Russia, Iran, and Iran’s
Lebanese Hezbollah proxy all support Assad’s position. The current violation of several cease-fires and
daily bombardments by Syria and its allies in Idlib, a
small enclave controlled by Turkey in northwest Syria
and inhabited by al-Qaeda and anti-Assad, Syrian
militia, that is Ahrar al-Sham, and their families, attest
to Assad’s strategic interest in extending his full control over all territories lost during the early days of the
Syrian popular uprising in 2011.
In the meantime, continuing tensions between
Turkey and its regional neighbors—especially
Syria, Libya, the Arab gulf states, Israel, Greece, and
Cyprus—are likely to ensure that Turkey-US relations
remain at a crossroad.
POSTSCRIPT II
On October 14, 2019, Turkey entered Syria with
tacit support from President Trump to secure strategic terrain adjacent to its border areas and to primarily
expel its old nemesis, the PKK, and its Syrian affiliate,
the YPG—whom Turkey and its Kurdish umbrella
organization, the Syrian Defense Forces, consider to
be terrorist organizations. Turkey may finally be able
to establish its long-coveted safe zone in the liberated
82. Sarah Dadouch, “Turkey, US Agree to Form Joint Operation Center for Syria Safe Zone,” WHTC, August 7, 2019,
https://whtc.com/news/articles/2019/aug/07/turkey-says-us-getting
-closer-to-its-views-in-syria-safe-zone-talks-anadolu/925363/?refer
-section=world.
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areas to allow some of the 3.5 million Syrian refugees
currently residing in Turkey to return. This of course
is a temporary solution to Turkey’s more complex and
protracted economic and financial problems resulting
from the Syrian refugee problem it currently faces. It
is most likely, however, that such a zone will remain
unstable for the foreseeable future because of strategic
differences with Russia, Iran, and Syria, who prefer full
and total control over all Syrian territory by the Syrian
regime of Bashar Assad—an end state that is inimical to Syrian Kurdish aspirations for local autonomy.
Moreover, though it has the tacit support of Russia,
the current Turkish incursion into Syria is not likely to
reach deep into Syria’s heartland, which is currently
under the control of Damascus and its Iranian, Hezbollah, and Russian military. In short, the current Turkish
military operations in Syria are indeed limited both in
scope and sustainability. In the meantime, President
Trump is under increasing pressure from key supporters in Congress and elsewhere to halt or to slow down
Turkish military operations against the Kurds. Sanction threats against Turkey by key allies of the president and Congress could backfire, however, given that
Turkey is an important strategic partner in NATO and
an important player in the global fight, along with the
United States, against terrorism and extremism in the
region. The unintended consequence of the proposed
US sanctions against Turkey is to move Turkey closer
to the Russian orbit, thus weakening NATO as an alliance and forcing Turkey to take dramatic steps to curtail US military presence on Turkish soil, especially
at Incirlik Air Base. In the meantime, there appears to
be a split between NATO on one hand and Western
European capitals on the other over the timing and
aggressiveness of Turkish military operations currently underway in Syria. NATO has refrained from
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criticizing Turkey, thus recognizing that the latter has
legitimate grievances, while Western European leaders have been quick to criticize Turkey for attacking
the Syrian Kurdish-controlled areas. NATO is currently struggling to preserve the cohesion of the troubled alliance, while individual Western European
states are taking steps to contain Turkey.83 The current
US objective to reach a settlement between Turkey
and the Kurdish Syrian Defense Forces to redeploy the
Kurdish militia as far away as possible from Turkey’s
border is a step in the right direction.

83. Michael Birnbaum, “European Leaders Demand a Halt
to Turkish Offensive in Syria,” Washington Post, October 14,
2019, A-15; “Germany, France Stop Arms Exports to Turkey
Amid Operation Peace Spring in Syria,” Daily Sabah, October 13,
2019, 1; and “Turkey Has ‘Legitimate Security Concerns’: NATO
Chief,” Anadolu Agency, October 14, 2019, https://www.aa.com.tr
/en/europe/turkey-has-legitimate-security-concerns
-nato-chief/1613310. For an insightful look into why the USSyrian-Kurdish alliance was doomed to fail, see Amanda Sloat,
“Our Alliance with Kurdish Fighters Was Doomed,” Washington
Post, October 13, 2019, B-4.
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